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An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies1
In July, 2008, two officers of the Los Angeles Police Department took an oath in
a criminal jury trial and testified that the defendant, who was charged with possessing
cocaine, had run from them before throwing a “black box,” which concealed both powder
and crack cocaine.2 Normally, the officers’ testimony would have been sufficient to
convict the defendant. But this time the officers’ testimony fell short. Unknown to the
police, the whole incident had been captured on a grainy video from a surveillance
camera mounted on a nearby apartment building.3 The video, which the defendant’s
lawyer produced for the first time at trial, “sharply contradicted the testimony of the two
police officers.”4 As a result of the tape, the prosecutor moved to dismiss the case, and
the judge agreed.5
Relying on the video evidence, the defense attorney declared that the cocaine was
not the defendant’s and that the case had been “trumped up.”6 In other words, the
defense claimed that the defendant “didn’t do it.” The prosecution stopped short of
conceding the defendant’s innocence but admitted: “There do appear to be sufficient
inconsistencies to render a verdict beyond a reasonable doubt unlikely in this case.”7 In
the prosecutor’s view, the video evidence did not establish substantive innocence, but it
revealed that police violated constitutionally-required procedures. In short, everyone
1
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(prosecutor, defense lawyer, and judge) agreed that the video proved that the two officers
had lied.8 After all, everyone could see (and hear) the lies for themselves. Unfortunately,
this scenario -- police telling lies -- is all too common.9
Although the Supreme Court has often said that truth is an imperative to justice,10
we now know that police officers,11 the key investigative component in our criminal
justice system, lie, even under oath.12 How often do the police lie? No one knows for
sure. But credible reports of police lies are common. In addition to police lies captured
on video and audio recordings, trial judges have become increasingly skeptical about
police testimony in suppression matters.13 Juries have found police lies using a beyond-

8

In this Article, “lie” means an intentional misstatement of a factual occurrence. Lie is meant to cover
intentional dishonesty, not mistakes or a reasonable characterization of facts that with the benefit of
hindsight seems less reasonable.
9
After a study of Chicago’s criminal justice system, Myron W. Orfield, Jr., said: “The idea of police
officers lying under oath is difficult for many people to accept, yet it unquestionably occurs in Chicago.”
Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago
Criminal Courts, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 75, 96 (1992). Although Orfield’s statement was limited to the
Chicago system, this Article will show widespread evidence of police lies, including perjury.
10
For instance, in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972), the Court reiterated: “[D]eliberate
deception of a court and jurors by the presentation of known false evidence is incompatible with
‘rudimentary demands of justice.’” See also Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1841, 1846 (2009)
(noting the “need to prevent perjury” as a means “to assure the integrity of the trial process.”); James v.
Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) (“There is no gainsaying that arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal
of our legal system.’”) (quoting United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980)); Oregon v. Hass, 420
U.S. 714, 722 (1975) (“We are, after all, always engaged in a search for truth in a criminal case so long as
the search is surrounded with the safeguards provided by our Constitution.”).
11
In this Article, a reference to “police” is meant to include all law enforcement officers, whether state,
federal, or local, unless otherwise indicated.
12
The wide-ranging evidence of police lies, even police perjury, is discussed in detail in Section I.A, infra.
Of that varied evidence, there are two, older empirical studies that provide particularly persuasive evidence
of police dishonesty during suppression matters. See, e.g., Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police
Search-and-Seizure Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 Colum. J. L. & Social Prob. 87, 92, 95 (1968)
(comparing narcotics cases in New York City, before and after the Mapp v. Ohio decision, which imposed
the exclusionary rule on state prosecutions, and reporting a “sharp decline” in allegations that “contraband
was found on the defendant’s body or hidden in the premises” and an accompanying “suspicious rise in
cases in which uniform and plainclothes officers alleged that the defendant dropped the contraband to the
ground” or had it “in hand” or “openly exposed in the premises); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary
Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1016, 105051 (1987) (reporting the results of interviews of twenty-six narcotics officers in the Chicago Police
Department in which “[v]irtually all of the officers admit[ted] that the police commit perjury, if
infrequently, at suppression hearings.”). More recent examples of police lies are usually captured by video
recordings, as in the example given in the introduction to this Article.
13
See Section I.A.(2)., infra.
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a-reasonable-doubt standard.14 Some judges, prosecutors, and criminal defense lawyers
believe that the police often lie successfully at pretrial hearings to avoid application of the
exclusionary rule.15 Commissions have convened, studied, and documented police lies.16
And there is circumstantial evidence of police lies, along with other police misconduct,
from the work of the Innocence Project and a recent empirical study conducted by
Brandon Garrett.17
Our legal system treats the police as if they are impartial fact gatherers, trained
and motivated to gather facts both for and against guilt, rather than biased advocates
attempting to disprove innocence, which is the reality. Because of its partiality in favor
of officers, the criminal justice system lacks the appropriate structure to expose and
effectively deter police lies, which distort the truth about criminal or unconstitutional
conduct.
This Article, presented in three parts, argues that the current system should be
changed to provide the structure necessary to promote honest police work. Specifically,
it urges a modification to the exclusionary rule that will encourage police to tell the truth
about the lies they tell and the potentially unconstitutional conduct they commit. In other
words, it advocates for an exclusionary rule tailored especially for police lies.
Part I catalogs the evidence that police lie. It illustrates that police lies are a
prevalent part of many American criminal prosecutions. It also demonstrates that some
of these lies interfere with accurate substantive outcomes, meaning that some innocent
people have been wrongly convicted because of the lies. Part I further demonstrates that
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truth-distorting lies are decaying the public’s confidence in the integrity of our criminal
justice system and reducing the protections supposedly guaranteed by the federal
Constitution, jeopardizing, in the long-term, the likelihood that juries and judges will
continue to believe the government’s evidence in criminal cases.
Part II considers what the Supreme Court has said, expressly or implicitly, about
police lies, the exclusionary rule, and other procedural rules that advance or inhibit police
dishonesty, and it examines other components of our criminal justice process that
promote police lies. It explains that the Supreme Court’s precedent reveals that the Court
is ambivalent about police lies. Some of the Court’s precedent discourages such lies and
other decisions show an indifference toward them.
The third and final Part differentiates between two meaningfully distinct types of
police lies: (1) those that expose the truth; and (2) those that distort it. It urges the
adoption of a modified exclusionary rule for criminal cases that hinge on police
credibility. It argues for maintenance of the status quo for cases involving police lies that
expose the truth regarding a defendant’s criminal behaviors but contends that harsher,
more certain and immediate consequences must follow when a judge or jury finds
significant evidence that an officer lied to distort the truth about a defendant’s actions,
statements, or culpability, or about the officer’s own conduct. Finally, in cases in which
the police “come clean” about lies they tell suspects or potentially unconstitutional
conduct they commit when trying to “catch the bad guy,” the modified exclusionary rule
proposed here provides for significantly more judicial and citizen oversight to assess
whether the ends of justice necessitated those police lies, given the facts, circumstances,
and competing interests in an individual case.
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I.

Cataloguing the Evidence and Effects of Police Lies
Although few would debate that truth is crucial to an effective and reliable

criminal justice system, we know from anecdotal evidence that witnesses occasionally lie
and that some of these sworn witnesses are law enforcement officers.18 We also know
that police officers regularly lie during investigations (sometimes with the imprimatur of
the Supreme Court) to gain the trust of a suspect or to convince a suspect to admit
criminal behavior.19 On occasion, the evidence suggests, officers lie to cover up
wrongdoing, either their own or that of fellow officers.21 And, it seems, police often
justify their lies by convincing themselves that lying will ensure that a guilty and

18

See note 2, and related discussion, supra and note 23, and related discussion, infra.
See Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 425 (1996)
(discussing, in depth, the police’s use of lies to effectively elicit confessions from the accused).
21
For example, in February, 2009, after a traffic accident in which an officer was to blame, several
members of the Hollywood (Florida) Police Department were caught on a dashboard camera rehearsing a
story to blame the incident on a twenty-three-year-old woman. On the audio, an officer can be heard
saying, “We’re going to bend this a little.” And he says, “I don’t lie and make things up, ever, because it’s
wrong, but if I need to bend it a little to protect a cop, I’ll do it.” Several other officers can be heard
agreeing to “bend” the narrative of what happened. One can be heard agreeing to take photos of the scene
so that it appears that the young woman caused the incident. Todd Wright, Charges Dropped Against
Woman Framed by Cops, NBCMiami (Jul. 29, 2009), available at http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/localbeat/Cops-Set-Up-Woman-After-Crash.html. See also Cynthia Williams, Officer Cleared of Planting
Evidence, Nashville News (Feb. 21, 2008), available at http://www.wsmv.com/news/15370841/detail.html
(showing video of Cookeville, Tennessee, police appearing to plant drugs on a defendant after searching
him several times without finding drugs, but officer was later exonerated by a Tennessee Bureau of
Investigation inquiry).
19
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dangerous defendant is not released or acquitted.22 This section examines the proof that
police lie (both in and out of court) and considers some of the implications of those lies.
A. The Evidence of Police Lies
For several decades, evidence of police lies has been mounting. The evidence can
be found on video and audio recordings, in findings by judges, in jury verdicts, and even
in empirical studies.
1. Evidence Captured on Video and Audio Recordings
The growing pervasiveness of technology in the United States has exposed police
lies that would have otherwise gone unnoticed or unchallenged. Such technology has the
potential to reveal much more police dishonesty. Consider this recent example.
In the summer of 2008, a New York tourist videoed a police officer pushing a
bicyclist off of his bike during an organized bike event.23 Although the video shows
Officer Patrick Pogan going out of his way to physically assault the cyclist, Pogan
arrested the biker and charged him with attempted assault, disorderly conduct, and
resisting arrest.24 In the official criminal complaint lodged by Pogan, he claimed that the

22

This conclusion has been reached by legal scholars. See e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, Reasonable Doubts
60, 68 (1996); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 1037, 1044 (1996). In addition, the conclusion is consistent with the findings from several empirical
studies. See, e.g., Sarah Barlow, Patterns of Arrests for Misdemeanor Narcotics Possession: Manhattan
Police Practices 1960-62, 4 Crim. L. Bull. 549 (1968) (a study of thousands of arrests in New York
suggesting that police altered their testimony following the decision in Mapp v. Ohio to avoid suppression
of evidence found on guilty defendants); Comment, Effect of Mapp v. Ohio on Police Search-and-Seizure
Practices in Narcotics Cases, 4 Colum. J. L. & Social Prob. 87 (1968) (study of criminal cases in New
York City before and after Mapp suggesting that police began lying to avoid suppression of contraband); J.
Skolnick, Justice Without Trial, at 215 (1967) (after conducting extensive observation of police in a
400,000-person city, Skolnick concluded that police attempt to construct a story of compliance with the
Constitution to ensure apprehension of criminals); Myron W. Orfield, Jr., The Exclusionary Rule and
Deterrence: An Empirical Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1016, 1051 (1987)
(finding that the police in Chicago “shade the facts” to establish probable cause when they think the
defendant is guilty).
23
John Eligon and Colin Moynihan, Officer Is Indicted in Toppling of Cyclist, N.Y. Times, Dec. 15, 2008,
available at http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/15/officer-to-be-indicted-in-toppling-of-cyclist/ .
24
Id.
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biker “rode straight into him.”25 In direct contrast to the officer’s assertion, the video
shows the cyclist swerving to avoid Pogan. Thus, the video establishes that Officer
Pogan lied about his conduct and that of the biker. After the tourist posted the video on
YouTube,26 a grand jury indicted Pogan for two felonies: filing a false instrument and
falsifying business records.27
Police lies have been caught on video in other cases too. There is the incident
fortuitously captured by a nearby recording device, which is referenced at the start of this
Article.28 And in a separate incident, in Atlanta, Officer Terrance Alexander was
videotaped pulling a middle-aged woman, Diana Dictrich-Barnes, from her car, throwing
her to the ground and handcuffing her. Although the officer claimed Dictrich-Barnes
struck him with her car door, video revealed that, at most, the mirror of her car may have
barely bumped the officer when he ordered her to move her car from the front of the
Atlanta airport.29 Video from the 2004 Republican National Convention revealed that
police lied when they claimed that they arrested protesters for unrest and resisting arrest.
Video of the arrests refuted the factual accuracy of the officers’ claims.30 In May of
2009, five police officers in Birmingham, Alabama were fired after video surfaced
revealing that they punched, kicked, and struck an unconscious suspect with a

25

Id.
Id.
27
Associated Press, New York City Cop Indicted in YouTube Bike Knockdown, Dec. 16, 2008, available at
http://www.wcbs880.com/Cop-Indicted-in-YouTube-Bike-Knockdown/3504837. In addition to the two
felony charges, Pogan was charged with three misdemeanors, including third-degree assault and making a
punishable false written statement. Id.
28
See supra, p. 1.
29
See Associated Press, Woman Manhandled by Police Officer Gets $350,000 Settlement, USA Today,
Nov. 16, 2005, available at http://www.usatoday.com/travel/news/2005-11-16-airport-scuffle_x.htm
30
See Jim Dwyer, Videos Challenge Accounts of Convention Unrest, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 2005, available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/12/nyregion/12video.html?ex=1270958400&en=46f3604d0befb92f&ei=
5090&partner=rssuserland.
26
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nightstick.31 And in February, 2009, after a traffic accident in which an officer was to
blame, several members of the Hollywood, Florida, Police Department were caught on a
dashboard camera rehearsing a story to blame the incident on a twenty-three-year-old
woman, the driver of the car the officer struck.32 In the audio portion of the recording, an
officer can be heard saying, “We’re going to bend this a little.” And he says, “I don’t lie
and make things up, ever, because it’s wrong, but if I need to bend it a little to protect a
cop, I’ll do it.” Several other officers can be heard agreeing to “bend” the narrative of
what happened. One can be heard agreeing to take photos of the scene so that it appears
that the young woman caused the incident.33 In fact, the Internet is filled with videos in
which the police appear to be caught telling lies.34
Technology and its widespread public availability provides increasing
opportunities to accurately capture police-citizen encounters and to expose police lies.
2.

Evidence From Judges’ In-court Observations

Federal judges in New York have become increasingly suspicious of officers’
testimony in pretrial suppression hearings. As reported in The New York Times in May,

31

Robbie Brown, Tape of Beating Leads to Firing of 5 Officers, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2009, at A-14.
Todd Wright, Charges Dropped Against Woman Framed by Cops, NBCMiami (Jul. 29, 2009), available
at http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local-beat/Cops-Set-Up-Woman-After-Crash.html.
33
Id.
34
See, e.g. Thomas MacMillan, Priest’s Video Contradicts Police Report, New Haven Independent (March
12, 2009), available at http://newhavenindependent.org/archives/2009/03/priests_video_c.php (video shows
police officer confronting priest about using his video camera to video the officer, but police report claims
officer was afraid for his safety because priest had unknown, shiny object cupped in his hand); Jeffrey
Wolf, Videotape Shows Man Beaten by Denver Police, 9News.com (April 4, 2008), available at
http://www.9news.com/news/article.aspx?storyid=97466&catid=188 (although Denver police testified
under oath that man assaulted them and resisted arrest and that they had no idea how his teeth were broken,
video shows that man did not resist and that police slammed his teeth into pavement). Tonya Alanez,
Sunrise Man Cleared After Elevator Video Shows He Did Not Batter Fort Lauderdale Officers, South
Florida Sun Sentinel, Mar. 5, 2009, available at http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/broward/fortlauderdale/sfl-bn-0304video,0,6043429.story (video appeared to contradict officers’ report that defendant
assaulted officers).
32
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2008, several of these New York judges expressly rejected the sworn testimony of police
officers after concluding that the officers lied to avoid the suppression of evidence.35
According to The Times, in September, 2003, United States District Court Judge
John S. Martin, Jr., found that police lied about the consent a suspect purportedly gave
for a search of his apartment in which officers found a gun and marijuana.36 Similarly,
United States District Court Judge John E. Sprizzo concluded that the police lied about
why they searched a man on whom they found a .22 pistol.37 In March, 2005, U.S.
District Court Judge Barbara S. Jones rejected the testimony of two officers based on
“contradictions in the police accounts” regarding why they searched a man’s pocket,
which concealed a handgun.38 In March 2006, U.S. District Court Judge Laura Taylor
Swain decided to test officers’ testimony herself and “used a flashlight” in deciding that
police lied about the reason for conducting a search. An officer had testified that the
arrest of a suspect was sparked by the officer’s discovery of a gun when he looked into a
sports utility vehicle.39 When the defendant’s lawyer contended that the officer could not
have seen the gun because of extensive tinting on the SUV’s windows, Judge Taylor
Swift used a flashlight and attempted to peer into the SUV.40 When the judge could not
see inside, she concluded: “It was thus impossible for Officer Lynch to have observed
the gun through the window of the vehicle.”41

35

See Benjamin Weiser, Judges Question Police Credibility in Gun Cases, but Consequences Are Few,
N.Y. Times, May 12, 2008, at A-20.
36
Id.
37
Judge Sprizzo sits in Manhattan. Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
Id.
41
Benjamin Weiser, Judges Question Police Credibility in Gun Cases, but Consequences Are Few, N.Y.
Times, May 12, 2008, at A-20.
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The Times article also reported that in December, 2005, Judge Kimba M. Wood
found that a suspect’s father was more credible than police officer witnesses who offered
conflicting stories about their arrest of the defendant for possessing two loaded guns.42
The officers had testified that they obtained access to guns when the defendant’s father
allowed them into his apartment and agreed to a search of his son’s room.43 The father
denied giving consent.44 After hearing all of the testimony, Judge Wood resolved: “I
find incredible the testimony of the police officer witnesses that Pedro Rosa consented to
their entry into the apartment and their entry into Jason Rosa’s bedroom.”45 In this one
article alone, The Times documented “more than 20 cases in which trial judges found
police officers’ testimony to be unreliable [and] inconsistent[.]”46 Judges beyond New
York have sometimes expressed similar doubts about police testimony.
In April, 2009, after an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress,
a federal district court judge in Kansas expressly found that officers’ testimony about the
reason for a traffic stop of the defendant was not credible.48 In 2007, a district court
judge in Massachusetts suppressed evidence after finding that a Boston police officer lied
on the witness stand in a “contrived” story.”49 In 2003, a federal district court judge in
Illinois made an express finding that a police officer had lied under oath.50 And in
Boston, Mark L. Wolf, Chief Judge of the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts, “kicked off a legal brouhaha . . . by ruling that an arresting officer in a
42

Id.
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
48
United States v. Jose Maldonado, 08-10216-01-JTM (D. Kan. Apr. 14, 2009) (unreported).
49
United States v. Dessesaver, 527 F. Supp.2d 193, 194 (D. Mass. 2007).
50
Rankins v. Winzeler, 2003 WL 21058536 n. 3 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (judge on remand found that police officer
had lied).
43
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Boston gun case had testified falsely.”51 In fact, it is fairly common that trial court judges
believe that the police have made false statements in their sworn affidavits.52
Juries, too, have made findings of police dishonesty.
3. Jury Findings of Police Perjury
In May of 2008, an Atlanta jury convicted Officer Arthur Tesler of lying about his
participation in a drug raid during which police shot and killed an innocent, 92-year-old
African-American woman.54 The conviction of Tesler followed after three officers lied
about their raid on the elderly woman’s home and then told more lies to conceal a
botched investigation.55 According to prosecutors, “After searching the home and
finding no drugs, officers tried to cover up the mistake[.]”56 During the criminal trial of
Officer Tesler, a police witness cooperating in the investigation testified that “narcotics
officers routinely lie[] under oath when seeking search warrants.”57

51

Dick Lehr, A New “Bright Line Rule” Against Lying, The Boston Globe (Jul. 31, 2009). Judge Wolf is
also considering sanctions against the prosecutor who failed to immediately disclose that the officer’s
testimony contradicted what he had previously told prosecutors about the case. Amir EFrati, Legal System
Struggles With How to React When Police Officers Lie, The Wall Street Journal (Jan. 29, 2009),
52
See, e.g., Garcia-Zambrano, 530 F.3d 1249 (10th Cir. 2008) (district court found that officer made false
statement in affidavit and excised the false statement to determine if warrant still valid); United States v.
Tate, 524 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding that the defendant deserved a “Franks” hearing because of false
statements in an affidavit); United States v. George Torres-Ramos, 2008 WL 4667119 at *22 (C.D.Cal
2008) (unreported) (finding that officer “made false statements in the affidavit” warranting a “Franks”
hearing); Joyce v. City of Sea Isle City, 2008 WL 906266 (D. N.J. March 31, 2008) (slip op.) (plaintiffs
made substantial showing that two officers deliberately or recklessly included falsehoods in affidavit).
54
Associated Press, Jury Convicts Officer of Lying in Fatal Raid, N.Y. Times, May 21, 2008, at A-17.
55
Id. See also Steve Visser, Witness Ties Infamous Raid to Lie, Atlanta J. Const., May 9, 2008, available at
http://www.ajc.com/search/content/metro/stories/2008/05/09/tesler.html.
56
Associated Press, Jury Convicts Officer, supra note 54. The Atlanta Journal reported that officers Jason
R. Smith and Gregg Junnier pressured an informant to report falsely that he had bought cocaine at the
elderly woman’s home. After the shooting, the officers planted drugs in the woman’s basement to cover up
their gaff. The third officer, Tesler, went along with the cover up, reportedly because “he feared [the other
two] would frame him if he did not go along.” Id. at A-17.
57
Visser, Witness Ties, supra note 55 (reporting that former police detective Gregg Junnier, who pled
guilty to voluntary manslaughter for his part in the death of the elderly woman, claims that narcotics
officers routinely swear in affidavits for search warrants that they have verified information from their
informants, when, in reality, they have not).
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The Atlanta prosecution of the dishonest officer is far from an isolated event. In
significant numbers across the United States, juries, using a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard, have found officers guilty of perjury and other crimes involving dishonesty.58
Police have also pled guilty before trial to avoid such jury determinations.59 Perhaps the
most notorious modern example is the guilty plea of Mark Fuhrman following the trial
and acquittal of O.J. Simpson. During Simpson’s trial, Detective Fuhrman lied under
oath about his previous use of a racial epithet.60 Following Fuhrman’s testimony, tape
recordings were played for the Simpson jury. From those recordings, the jury could hear
Fuhrman using racially-charged words that he had previously denied ever uttering.61
Not uncommonly, groups of officers collude and commit perjury to conceal their
collective wrongdoing. For instance, in 1994 and 1995, several officers were convicted
of perjury after extensive corruption was uncovered in New York City.62 One officer was
“an ‘integrity officer’” in Harlem who was supposed to monitor “the honesty of the
58

See, e.g., William Glaberson, Guilty Verdict In Perjury Count in Louima Case, N.Y. Times, Jul. 17,
2002, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01E5DF1239F934A25754C0A9649C8B63 (reporting
that on July 16, 2002, former police officer Charles Schwartz was convicted of perjury by a jury for lying
when he denied leading a suspect to a police bathroom, where the suspect was physically abused and
sexually assaulted by another officer); Associated Press, Laurie Asseo, Appeal from Boston Policeman
Convicted of Perjury Rejected, Mar. 20, 2000, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/daily/20/scotus_perjury.htm (reporting that officer Kenneth Conley was
convicted of perjury by a Boston jury for lying about his knowledge of a suspect’s beating by several
officers); A.G. Sulzberger and Mathew R. Warren, Four-Month Sentence for Detective Convicted of
Perjury, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 2009, (reporting on the sentencing of a New York City Police detective
convicted of lying on the witness stand during an attempted murder trial).
59
See, e.g., David Abel, Officer Admits Steroids Charge, Boston Globe, Nov. 20, 2007, available at
http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/2007/11/20/officer_admits_steroids (reporting
that Eduardo Rodriguez, a suspended Boston police officer, pleaded guilty in federal court to distributing
steroids, committing perjury, and obstructing justice); CNN, Ex-L.A. Cop Sentenced to 5 Years, Aug. 13,
2002, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/08/07/rampart.sentencing/index.html (reporting that
former Los Angeles police officer Nino Durden pled guilty to perjury, filing false police reports, and
conspiracy to obstruct justice).
60
See http://www.lectlaw.com/files/case63.htm (providing the details of the plea entered in October, 1996).
61
Id. See also Steve Barnes, Agent Gets 10 Years’ Probation, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 2005, (former Texas
narcotics agent convicted of perjury for role in dozens of bogus drug arrests, mostly of black defendants).
62
See Joe Sexton, Jurors Question Honesty of Police, N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1995, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=990CEEDA123FF936
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precinct’s force.”63 In 2001, numerous criminal convictions resulted from extensive
police corruption, including lies and coverups, within the “Rampart Division” of the Los
Angeles Police Department.64 In 2002, former New York Police Department police
officer Charles Schwartz pled guilty to perjury stemming from officers’ cover up of the
torture of suspect Abner Louima.65 And, currently, retired Chicago police Commander
Jon Burge faces two federal charges of obstruction of justice and one count of perjury for
allegedly lying about whether he and other officers in Chicago physically abused suspects
to obtain confessions from them. A jury is expected to hear that case this year.67
4. Evidence From Commissions Dedicated to Studying
Police Corruption
The willingness of police to lie is not a new development. The Mollen
Commission, formed to study police corruption in New York City, found police perjury
rampant between 1992-1994.68 The Commission reported extensive police corruption,
including that officers “falsified official reports and perjured themselves to conceal their
misdeeds.”69 The Mollen Commission report reiterated similar findings from two
decades before in which a different Commission reported on extensive lies and

63

Id.
See Charles Rappleye, New Harder Look Produces More Charges Against Cops, LaWeekly (Apr. 12,
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corresponding corruption in the New York Police Department.70 And New York is not
alone in its history of police corruption and lies. There is similar evidence of police
misconduct from Boston, Atlanta, Los Angeles, and other cities.71
5. Evidence From an Empirical Study of Chicago’s State Criminal Justice
System
A study published in 1992 by Myron Orfield, Jr., revealed that police, judges,
prosecutors, and criminal defense lawyers in Chicago perceived “a pattern of pervasive
police perjury.”72 These participants in Chicago’s criminal justice system reported
“systematic fabrications in case reports and affidavits for search warrants, creating
artificial probable cause which forms the basis of later testimony.”73 In fact, of the
judges, prosecutors and public defenders who were interviewed, all but one “believe[d]
that police lie in court to evade the exclusionary rule.”74 Of the police interviewees,
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The Knapp Commission Report on Police Corruption (Dec. 1972).
See, e.g., Laura Dannen, Katie Liesener, and Rachel Lux, System to Stem Police Perjury Not
Implemented, The Boston Globe, Oct. 24, 2005 (reporting that despite a 1997 pronouncement of “a
sweeping crackdown” on police perjury, eight years later, little had changed); Scott Turow, Lying to Get
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Vannatter recklessly disregarded the truth in a warrant application for Simpson’s home).
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Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. at 83.
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Id. at 96. Orfield interviewed twenty-six of about one hundred narcotics officers in the Chicago Police
Department, id. at 79, and randomly selected the lawyers and judges associated with 14 of 41 felony trial
courtrooms for additional interviews. Id. at 81.
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ninety-five percent “believed that police officers sometimes lie in court to avoid having
evidence suppressed.”75
Strikingly, two prosecutors admitted that some prosecutors advance police perjury
on suppression matters. One detailed: “One of the techniques commonly used was
inducing police perjury. You’d say to the witness, after you’d looked at his [case report]
‘If this happens, we win. If this happens, we lose.’ Guess what he’d say?”76 A second
prosecutor admitted that he had personally encouraged police perjury in suppression
matters by telling officers to “toughen up certain aspects” of their story.77 He then
defended his practice, adding: “Never on the issue of guilt or innocence.”78
Perhaps even more interesting than the fact that virtually every judge, prosecutor,
defense lawyer and narcotics officer interviewed agreed that police do lie, was the
participants’ interpretation of the word lie or perjury. In Orfield’s interviews, two out of
ten judges, six out of fourteen public defenders, and three out of fourteen state
prosecutors did not equate police lies to committing perjury, as long as the lies were told
during a suppression hearing.79 In other words, almost one third of the judges and
lawyers surveyed in the Chicago system did not think that an officer commits the crime
of perjury when he or she lies under oath about how evidence was obtained. One
attorney explained his perception this way: “Lying is a strong word. Fudge it is what
they do.”80 The same lawyer followed up: “[P]erjury is where the officer lied about guilt
or innocence. They don’t lie about that.”81 One of the judges interviewed was adamant
75
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that in the suppression context, police lies were not perjury. “Of course it is not perjury.
Who would ever think it was perjury?” The judge added, “Perjury is when you contradict
a prior sworn statement while you are under oath.”82
Orfield’s study appears to reveal not only that police tell a significant number of
lies, but also that the Chicago judicial system tolerates such lies in some contexts, like
suppression hearings. And there has been no significant structural or procedural change
to our system of justice since 1992 that would make such police lies more costly or less
likely.
6. Other Circumstantial Evidence of Police Lies
One of the obvious impediments to the justice system’s ability to deal effectively
with police lies is its inability to distinguish between intentional deception and police
mistakes. While sections I.A.(1)-(5) detail the growing evidence of flagrant police lies –
those that seemed sufficiently obvious to juries, judges, commissions, researchers, and
ordinary citizens -- this section highlights additional, circumstantial evidence of the
pervasiveness of police lies. The Innocence Project has uncovered strong circumstantial
evidence that police often lie during investigations.83 In addition, Brandon L. Garrett
conducted a follow-up study of the first two hundred convicted persons, later exonerated
through DNA evidence, and that study buttresses the findings of the Innocence Project.
According to the Project, half of the first seventy-four wrongly-convicted
defendants were found guilty as a result of “police misconduct.”84 It is unclear precisely
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Id. at 114.
Of course, DNA is not likely to reveal wrongful convictions in cases other than violent crime like rape
and murder, so this data understates the impact of police lies and misconduct on all criminal convictions.
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See http://www.innocenceproject.org/undertand/Government-Misconduct.php. According to the
Innocence Project, 34% of police misconduct included the suppression of exculpatory evidence; 33% was
attributable to unduly-suggestive pretrial practices; 11% was caused by evidence fabrication; 9% was due
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how much of that misconduct is attributable to outright lies. It seems fair to characterize
eleven percent of the exoneration cases in the purposeful-police-lie category because in
eleven percent of cases, the Innocence Project found that police “fabricat[ed]” evidence.85
It is difficult to imagine that police could fabricate evidence and obtain a conviction
without accompanying the false evidence with lies.
More ambiguous examples include the case of Johnnie Earl Lindsey who, in
September 2008, was cleared after serving time in prison for a twenty-five-year-old rape
conviction. The evidence now shows that police included Lindsey’s picture in a sixphoto array and sent it to the victim about a year after her attack.86 The victim had
reported that her attacker was “shirtless.” Of the six photos shown to the victim, only
Lindsey’s and one other photo depicted a shirtless man.87 The victim chose Lindsey’s
photo, even though Lindsey had produced time cards from his job indicating that he was
working at the time of the rape.88 Years after the fact, it is unclear whether the police in
Lindsey’s case intended to mislead the witness or simply became myopic in their focus
on him.
Brandon L. Garrett has analyzed the cases correlated to the first two hundred
criminally-convicted people eventually cleared by DNA evidence.89 His study reveals
that faulty forensic evidence combined with dubious or false testimony interpreting that
science contributed to a substantial number of the wrongful convictions.90 In multiple
cases, the government’s forensic expert offered “misleading testimony and
to coercing witnesses; 8% was related to coerced confessions; and 5% was caused by other police
misconduct. Id.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
Id. Lindsey’s boss also corroborated his presence at work. Id.
89
Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (2008).
90
Id. at 81-84.
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mischaracterized their own laboratory reports.”91 For example, according to Garrett’s
research, “[i]n one case, that of Gilbert Alejandro, the criminalist claimed a DNA match
even though neither he nor anyone else had even conducted the DNA testing.”92 In
another case study, that of Paul D. Kordonowy, who had been convicted of rape, Garrett
found that bogus hair-match evidence contributed to the conviction.
Montana Forensic Science Laboratory specialist Arnold Melnikoff did not
correctly explain the lack of probative power of hair comparison. Instead,
he testified that he could distinguish head hairs in 99 of 100 cases, telling
the jury that Kordonowy's hair and blood type matched those found at the
scene. In fact, an enzyme in the blood sample did not match Kordonowy,
nor did the hairs, and yet Melnikoff's testimony contributed to
Kordonowy's wrongful imprisonment for thirteen years. Melnikoff was
later fired, but not before he falsified testimony in at least one other case.93
Of course, laboratory specialists and scientists, like Melnikoff, are distinguishable
from “the police,” who control multiple aspects of a criminal investigation designed to
identify, arrest and convict guilty defendants. Police are permitted extensive discretion in
how to conduct these investigations. Also, the motives of government scientists could be
different than those of the police. Their training is probably significantly different too.
The government recently made these same types of arguments before the Supreme Court
in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, in the context of trying to convince the Court that the
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not apply to laboratory professionals who
produce results reflecting “neutral, scientific testing.”94 The government in MelendezDiaz contended that scientific testimony is different than “testimony recounting historical
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events, which is ‘prone to distortion or manipulation.’”95 But Garrett’s findings of
scientific wrongdoing illustrate the widespread nature of governmental misconduct
(much of which is necessarily concealed by lies) that impacts outcomes in criminal cases,
and they impliedly suggest that government actors as a whole, not just police, feel at least
some pressure to convict those charged with crimes. In other words, the lies and other
misconduct of government-sponsored scientists provide circumstantial evidence of the
culture and prevalence of lies that impact the American criminal justice system generally.
A majority of the Supreme Court appears to agree that even laboratory scientists
sometimes feel pressure to conform their findings to the prosecution’s case. In ruling that
the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause applies to reports of such scientists, the
Court recognized that a majority of laboratories producing forensic evidence “are
administered by law enforcement agencies, such as police departments, where the
laboratory administrator reports to the head of the agency.”96 The Court also appeared to
accept that forensic scientists “resonding to a request from a law enforcement official
may feel pressure—or have an incentive—to alter the evidence in a manner favorable to
the prosecution.”97 The recognition that “neutral scientists” who work for law
enforcement agencies sometimes feel pressure (and submit to that pressure) to alter their
findings to benefit prosecution and conviction is strong circumstantial evidence that law
enforcement officers, who are more directly associated with such prosecutions, feel
pressure to stretch the evidence to favor the prosecution.
In any event, Garrett’s findings were not confined to flaws in the scientists’
evidence. In addition to evidence of misleading testimony from forensic scientists,
95

Id. at 2536.
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Garrett found evidence that in thirty-one cases (16%), defendants had falsely confessed.98
The inferential evidence suggests that these confessions were prompted by overzealous
police officers. Garrett describes the evidence this way:
In retrospect, DNA evidence tells us that these confessions were false.
Courts often highlighted in their opinions the corroborated nonpublic
details that made these confessions appear to be particularly credible at the
time. For example, in the case of Earl Washington, the Fourth Circuit
emphasized that: Washington had supplied without prompting details of
the crime that were corroborated by evidence taken from the scene and by
the observations of those investigating the [victim's] apartment. He had
confessed to the crime not in a general manner, but as one who was
familiar with the minutiae of its execution.
Now that we know that convicts like Washington were actually innocent,
we may also know that they could not have, “without prompting,” offered
accurate and nonpublic details in their confessions. Unless the person was
an accomplice, if those details were truly nonpublic, they could have come
only from law enforcement. Thus, in some cases DNA proves not only
that the defendant was innocent, but also that police fed facts, asked
leading questions, supplied details, and in cases such as Earl
Washington's, lied later about what happened and claimed that the suspect
offered the details “without prompting.”99
In addition to evidence suggesting that officers unduly influenced some innocent
defendants to confess, Garrett found evidence that the police made certain confessions
appear more believable by “suppl[ying] false facts to bolster false confessions” at trial.100
The implication of Garrett’s findings is that the current criminal justice system
sometimes produces substantively inaccurate results, even in serious felony cases,
because of flawed scientific evidence and false confessions and that some of the flawed
science and false confessions can be attributed to intentionally-misleading testimony and
police dishonesty about the manner in which a confession was secured.
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Section I.A. has catalogued the extensive direct and circumstantial evidence that
some police officers lie, at least occasionally, and that many of these lies are told despite
the officer’s oath to tell nothing but the truth. Section I.B. discusses some of the most
detrimental effects of police lies on a fair criminal justice system.

B. The Effects of Police Lies
As Justice Blackmun once declared: “[T]here is almost nothing more convincing
than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the defendant, and says,
‘That’s the one!’”101 Justice Blackmun’s sentiment is especially true when the witness is
a police officer.
As the evidence in Section I.A. shows, police lie to “get the bad guy,” to further
their careers, to cover up mistakes, to support fellow officers, to prevent the suppression
of evidence, and for many other reasons.102 Whether the lie an officer tells is simple or
compound, whether told with malice or a pure motive, police lies are necessarily
significant. They affect case outcomes because officers are the key investigative
component in our criminal justice system. Police gather, handle, and test physical
evidence. They testify in grand jury proceedings, at bail hearings, preliminary hearings,
suppression hearings, and trials, identifying and explaining the evidence of guilt and how
it was gathered. The police decide who to interview, where to look, what documents to
101

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 72 n. 8 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing E. Loftus, Eyewitness
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Christopher Slobogin has argued that “the most common venue for testilying is the suppression hearing
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collect, what people and places to leave uninvestigated, what questions to ask, and with
what tone to ask them. Police flavor and shape every case from beginning to end.
Without their evidence gathering, evidence testing, and testimony, few criminals could be
convicted. This section briefly considers a few of the significant costs of police lies.103
1. Police Lies Thwart Constitutional Rights
When police lie and get away with it, they exercise a unique power that unilaterally
reduces the protections of the Constitution. When they lie, police, rather than judges,
legislators, jurors, or voters, empower themselves to decide who the Constitution protects
and how much protection it gives. They also make these decisions without legislative or
judicial oversight. Each police lie that manufactures a reason to support an otherwise
“unreasonable” search or seizure deprives all citizens of their confidence in the Fourth
Amendment’s protections against government intrusions into privacy, liberty, and
dignity.104 The Fifth Amendment, which protects against compelled self incrimination and
guarantees due process of law,105 is divested of its potency with every police lie that covers
up coercive police tactics resulting in a statement against a suspect’s interests. Lies can
frustrate the protections the Supreme Court provided in Miranda v. Arizona,106 and they
can prevent a defendant from enjoying his Constitutionally-guaranteed right to the advice
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Obviously, there are also costs associated with police mistakes. Those costs are beyond the scope of this
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interrogation).
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of counsel.107 When police undermine these important rights, wrongful convictions can,
and sometimes do, follow.108
When the police single-handedly thwart constitutional rights by lying, they
undermine the entire system of justice, which, at a minimum, is set up to allow welleducated and trained lawyers to present competing and compelling arguments about the
propriety of these guarantees and the effects of the government’s breach of these
constitutional protections. Likewise, lies impair the citizens’ voting power because
normally citizens vote for their local prosecutors and judges who, in turn, exercise
discretion over whom to charge with a crime, what charges to assert, and what sentence is
appropriate and proportional for the individual defendant and prohibited conduct. When
the police lie about a defendant’s behavior, they interfere with this structure and frustrate
the citizens’ power to elect its officials and to provide a buffer between citizens and the
government. Similarly, police lies of this kind interfere with the responsibilities of
judges, who are trained in the law and politically-accountable to the people, to review the
arguments of lawyers and make well-grounded and impartial judgments about which
competing interests should prevail in a given case.
Beyond the constitutional and judicial protections that are lost when police lie
effectively and infringe rights, unilateral police decisions weaken the potency of juries
comprised of thoughtful and diverse citizens, who otherwise protect individuals from
overreaching by judges and other governmental actors.109 Police lies also hinder the role
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of appellate courts, which are tasked with declaring rules that will ensure that the
Constitution is enforced in a manner that is consistent with the intent of the Framers and
the will of the People. The power and responsibilities assigned to prosecutors, defense
lawyers, trial judges, appellate judges, citizens, and citizen juries are diluted, if not
nullified, when police lie and decide for themselves who is and is not protected by the
Constitution. As Justice Brennan emphasized in his dissenting opinion in Illinois v.
Gates,110 our system of justice expects officers to remain “under the law”; this is not a
“police-state where they are the law.”111
2. Police Lies Can Leave Criminals Undetected and
Unprosecuted
Odds are, most of us will neither suffer a wrongful conviction nor know someone
who does. Nevertheless, apathy toward the rights of criminal defendants and the
unfortunate few who are wrongly convicted would be a mistake because prosecuting the
wrong person leaves the real culprit undetected and unprosecuted. If the police honestly,
but incorrectly, believe that X committed the crime, they will not look for Y, the real
culprit. In addition, they will become myopic in analyzing evidence and interviewing
witnesses,112 viewing every detail they uncover from the perspective of an officer who
believes that he knows “who did it.” And if the officer “fudges” his reports or his
testimony to ensure conviction of the person he thinks is guilty, he will guarantee not
only the conviction of an innocent person, but also the freedom of someone who is

145, 155 (1968). Government oppression includes “judges too responsive to the voice of higher authority.”
Id. at 156.
110
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
111
Id. at 291 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 17 (1948)).
112
Add additional support. Of the first two-hundred people shown by DNA to have been wrongly
convicted, about eighteen percent claimed on appeal that police had unduly suggested the defendant as the
perpetrator. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 Colum. L. Rev. at 19 (“Twenty-nine of the
innocent appellants during their appeals raised suggestive eyewitness identification claims”).
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culpable and should be convicted, incapacitated, and punished. Thus, in Dallas County,
Texas, where Johnnie Earl Lindsey was released after DNA established that he did not in
1981 rape the woman who later identified him from a skewed photo array, we now know
that the real rapist has gone unpunished for more than twenty-seven years. Given statutes
of limitation, the real rapist is probably beyond prosecution because it took too long for
society to uncover the truth.
Adding to the likelihood of unjust outcomes (in which the guilty remain
unprosecuted) is the persuasive affect police lies have on prosecutors. Professor Alafair
Burke has persuasively argued that as humans, prosecutors fall victim to the usual human
tendencies, including forming strong beliefs about a defendant’s guilt and resisting any
change in that belief.113 She says, “Decades of empirical research demonstrate that
people’s beliefs are both imperfect and resistant to change. Once people form theories,
they fail to adjust the strength of their beliefs when confronted with evidence that
challenges the accuracy of those theories.”114 Prosecutors are accustomed to receiving
evidence from the police and can and do form strong beliefs about the guilt of a particular
defendant based on the police narratives about the evidence and the strengths and
weaknesses of witnesses and claimed defenses.
If the police lie about the evidence and the validity of the case, (especially if they
tell the lies because of their own convictions in the defendant’s guilt), prosecutors may
become entrenched in the police’s beliefs that the defendant did it. This myopic view
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also will cause prosecutors to discount exculpatory evidence and other strong indicators
that they are pursuing the wrong person.
3. Police Lies Undermine Public Trust
Most police lies are “wrong because once [] discovered, [they] diminish[] one of
our most crucial ‘social goods’ – trust in government.”115 Police lies can undermine
public trust in ways that other witnesses’ lies do not. “What distinguishes police officers
is their unique power -- to use force, to summarily deprive a citizen of freedom, to even
use deadly force, if necessary -- and their commensurately unique responsibilities--to be
the living embodiment of the ‘law’ in our communities, as applied fairly to every
member.”116 Because of the expansive power of the police, the “revelation that some
police routinely and casually lie [especially under oath,] makes members of the public,
including those who serve on juries, less willing to believe all police, truthful or not.”117
For instance, after extensive police corruption was exposed in New York City in 1994,
The New York Times reported that potential jurors of varied backgrounds were highly
skeptical of police. The newspaper conducted numerous interviews in jury rooms in
Brooklyn, Queens, and Manhattan over a two-day period.118 A 68-year-old, white
woman from an upscale New York neighborhood and a 19-year-old, black man from a
housing project each told The Times that they distrusted New York City’s police
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officers.119 According to the young man, “‘I live in the projects, and so I know the reality
of having seen the police in action day after day’ . . . ‘I know that, depending on what’s at
stake, the police will lie.’”120 According to the older woman, “ ‘I have lived long enough
to have seen corruption problems come and go several times over. They clean it up and it
gets dirty again. It looks like it’s dirty again.’”121
Police lies also “diminish[] law enforcement’s effectiveness in the streets.”122
Few are willing to cooperate with police, worried that police will misuse their
information. And to the extent that other members of the judicial system – like
prosecutors and judges -- appear to condone police lies, by doing nothing to report,
punish or deter them, “the loss of public trust may extend beyond law enforcement to the
criminal justice system generally.”123
If police sometimes lie about evidence and how it was collected, why should
citizens, including petit and grand juries, trust in the correctness of a conviction that also
rests on the integrity of the police who investigated the case? And why would juries (or
judges) think that the police revealed weaknesses in the evidence to the prosecutor?
Should juries and citizens believe the charges, or even the witnesses who are interviewed
and prepared by officers willing to lie to obtain a conviction? An accurate and fair
system cannot thrive if the police, who are integral to the system. will say whatever it
takes to make the charges stick.
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4. Police Lies Sometimes Inflict a Double Negative -Allowing Both Guilty Defendants and Corrupt Officers to
Avoid Prosecution
Bennett Capers has convincingly argued that when police lie about Fourth
Amendment issues, their lies can create a problem of over-enforcement in addition to the
more obvious one of under-enforcement of the criminal laws.124 Laws may be overenforced because police target suspects for illegal reasons – Capers points to race. Under
this scenario, officers lie and claim that a Fourth Amendment search or seizure was
conducted for legitimate, non-racist reasons.125 At the same time, under-enforcement
may occur. When officers lie, sometimes their lies are eventually uncovered, and neither
a culpable defendant nor the officers are successfully prosecuted.126 The guilty defendant
escapes prosecution because the evidence against him is suppressed.127 The lying officer
skirts prosecution because perjury cases against such officers are too rarely pursued.128
5. Police Lies Can Lead to Conviction of the Innocent
Police lies sometimes result in innocent people pleading guilty to crimes they did
not commit. Trials are costly to defendants. At a minimum, if a defendant insists on the
protections of a trial to show his innocence, he typically loses the sentencing benefits of a
plea. Prosecutors are less willing to agree to a lenient sentence because the defendant has
forced the prosecution to spend money, exert effort, and use resources to prove the
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police for alleged misconduct, including a number of excessive force incidents); Morgan Cloud, The Dirty
Little Secret, 43 Emory L. J. 1311, 1313 (1994) (contending that police are rarely punished for perjury, let
alone prosecuted for it).
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case.129 Furthermore, after a jury (or in a bench trial, a judge) finds the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no reduction of the defendant’s sentence for his or her
“acceptance of responsibility” of wrongdoing. Because a defendant is faced with more
extreme sanctions following a trial than he faces following a plea of guilty, defendants
sometimes plead guilty to avoid the harsher penalties that accompany a trial.130 When
police lie to increase the strength of the evidence against a defendant, they increase the
pressure on the defendant to plead guilty, regardless of the defendant’s actual, factual
guilt.
DNA testing has proven that innocent defendants do plead guilty and that some
innocent suspects confess to crimes they did not commit.131 In about twenty-five percent
of the first two-hundred cases in which DNA later exonerated a defendant, “the
wrongfully convicted person either pleaded guilty, confessed to the crime, or made selfincriminating statements.”132
On first reflection, a false guilty plea or confession might seem counter-intuitive
or surprising. But it makes sense that a defendant would lose confidence that the system
would exonerate him, if police are willing to lie to make the evidence look as though he

129

See Julie R. O’Sullivan, In Defense of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines’ Modified Real-Offender System,
91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1342, 1415 (1997) (explaining how federal prosecutors use “acceptance of
responsibility” and a recommendation for a low-end of the Guidelines sentence to manage plea bargains to
save resources).
130
See, e.g., Brandon J. Lester, System Failure: The Case for Supplanting With Mediation in Plea
Bargaining, 20 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 563, 563 (2005) (recounting case in which mother who maintained
her innocence to criminal charges agreed to plead guilty out of fear that she would lose custody of her
children to her estranged husband if she did not get out of jail to fight for custody); Morris B. Hoffman, The
Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 Chi-Kent L. Rev. 663, 672 n. 44 (2007) (charging an innocent defendant
makes the system look “incapable of distinguishing the guilty from the innocent”)
131
Usually, DNA testing reveals nothing about non-violent cases, for instance, the run-of-the-mill drug
distribution case, the many fraud and public corruption cases. Therefore, DNA testing reveals nothing
about the likelihood that police may have lied in those cases.
132
See Mark Godsey, Editorial: DNA Testing Beyond a Shadow of a Doubt, Crim Prof Blog, Nov. 17,
2008, available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/crimprof_blog/2008/11/editorial-dna.See also Garrett,
Judging Innocence, supra note __.
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is guilty. If the police are telling lies about your criminal involvement and the amount or
strength of the evidence, it is not irrational to think that they will continue to lie and lie
convincingly to a jury, which will convict you, resulting in a severe sentencing
punishment. If police, who have access to and control over all of the trial evidence, are
willing to lie to convict you, there is little incentive to fight the lies, even if you are
innocent. If the result – a conviction – is inevitable, then the logical action to take is to
seek the most lenient sentencing solution available.
Even when they do not admit guilt, innocent people can be convicted at trial if
police tell lies about the investigation and the evidence. On September 23, 2008, the
Supreme Court temporarily stayed the scheduled execution of Troy A. Davis, who sits on
Georgia’s death row.133 The Court granted the stay to consider whether Davis’s case
deserved additional review given that seven of nine witnesses from Davis’s murder trial
have recanted their stories.134 According to Davis’s petition for a writ of certiorari, he is
innocent. In support of his substantive claim of innocence, he points, in part, to the fact
that the recanting witnesses now say that police coercion and “questionable interrogation
tactics” led them to misidentify Davis as the murderer.135
Assuming that the claims in Davis’s petition are true, police lies and
accompanying misconduct have tarnished the entire process, denying procedural
protections to Davis, as well as impairing his substantive rights by effecting a wrongful
conviction.136
133

Rhonda Cook, Bill Rankin, Marcus K. Garner, Supreme Court Issues Stay of Execution for Davis, Atl.
Journal-Const., Sept. 23, 2008, available at
http://www.ajc.com/metro/content/metro/stories/2008/09/23/davis_stay_execution.html.
134
Order of Stay.
135
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, available at 2008 WL 4366181 (July 14, 2008).
136
Timothy Masters, who was recently released from prison after serving nine years for a murder that he
did not commit, makes similar assertions. Masters blames “overzealous investigators” for concealing
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On Tuesday, October 14, 2008, the Supreme Court denied review in Davis’s case,
and the stay expired automatically.137
Part I has shown that police lies are an unfortunate part of the American system of
criminal justice and that they can be detrimental to both substantive and procedural
fairness. Part II will consider how the United States Supreme Court handles police lies.

II.

The Supreme Court’s Treatment of Police Lies
Whether a defendant is correctly labeled guilty depends on the accuracy of the

tangible evidence collected and introduced against him at hearings and trial and,
correspondingly, the credibility and accuracy of the witnesses who testify about that
evidence. Despite the uncontested importance of credibility to a proper finding of guilt,
the Supreme Court openly permits some police lies during criminal investigations,
tolerates some false testimony by officers who are investigating crimes, and the Supreme
Court’s precedent is occasionally openly hostile to the suppression of evidence, even
when police gather that evidence with lies or through unconstitutional behaviors. Part II
examines the Supreme Court’s treatment of police lies and its recent applications of the
exclusionary rule, which the Court employs to deter police misconduct, and it looks at
other procedural rules that impact the value of police lies to the current system of justice.
A.

The Court’s Precedent Is Generally Hostile to the Exclusionary Rule.

At least in theory, the exclusionary rule bars the use of evidence at a defendant’s
subsequent criminal trial, if the evidence was gathered by the police in violation of the

evidence that “might have cleared him.” See Kirk Johnson, Colorado: Wrongly Convicted Man Sues, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 22, 2008, at A-15. According to the star prosecution witness, the witness “would never have
testified as he did if he had been shown the entire police file.” Id.
137
Davis v. Georgia, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 397 (2008).
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Constitution.138 The basic idea – police will be deterred from violating the Constitution if
they know evidence gathered in violation of its mandates cannot be used to prove a
defendant’s guilt.139 But if the exclusionary rule was ever preferred,140 the Supreme
Court no longer favors it. By 1979, Justice Burger criticized the exclusionary rule for
leading to “practical poverty,” arguing that “[t]he suppression of truth is a grievous
necessity at best . . . .”141 More recently, the Court said in Hudson v. Michigan:
“Suppression of evidence . . . [is the Court’s] last resort, not our first impulse.”142 And
earlier this year, the Court in Herring v. United States declared:
The fact that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred . . . does not
necessarily mean that the exclusionary rule applies. . . . [O]ur precedents
establish important principles that constrain application of the exclusionary
rule. First, the exclusionary rule . . . applies only where it “result[s] in
appreciable deterrence.” We have repeatedly rejected the argument that
exclusion is a necessary consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation.
Instead we have focused on the efficacy of the rule in deterring Fourth
Amendment violations in the future. In addition, the benefits of deterrence
must outweigh the costs. “We have never suggested that the exclusionary
rule must apply in every circumstance in which it might provide marginal
deterrence.”143
Because a majority of the current Court disfavors the exclusionary rule, the Court
limits the contexts in which it applies the rule. The Court now refuses to apply the rule
whenever it deems that the costs of application (including the always-present cost of

138

See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (applying to state prosecutions, the exclusionary rule,
which prevents the government from introducing evidence at the criminal trial of an aggrieved defendant, if
the evidence is obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
139
See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 311 (1990) (“The occasional suppression of illegally obtained yet
probative evidence has long been considered a necessary cost of preserving overriding constitutional
values[.]”).
140
See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659 (indicating that “the imperative of judicial integrity” required imposition of
the exclusionary rule).
141
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (Burger, Chief J., dissenting).
142
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006).
143
Herring v. United States, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 695, 700 (2009); see also Montejo v. Louisiana, No. 071529 (May 26, 2009) (noting that “[t]he principal cost of applying any exclusionary rule ‘is, of course,
letting guilty and possibly dangerous criminals go free . . .’”).
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allowing a potentially-guilty defendant to go free), outweigh the deterrence benefits.144
In 2009, the Court suggested that the costs of application will always be too great if the
challenged police conduct is the result of simple and isolated negligence.145
In Herring, an officer relied on a faulty computer record maintained by a law
enforcement organization in concluding that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for
defendant Herring.146 Acting in accordance with the computer record, an officer
subjected Herring and his car to a traffic stop and arrested him. Then, the officer searched
Herring and his car incident to the arrest and found amphetamine in Herring's pocket and
a pistol (which as a felon he could not possess) in his car.147 Later, officers learned that
there had been a mistake. There was no outstanding warrant for Herring’s arrest. The
warrant had been recalled five months earlier.148
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts began the opinion with a general
rebuke of the exclusionary rule. “Our cases establish that . . . suppression is not an
automatic consequence of a Fourth Amendment violation. Instead, the question turns on
the culpability of the police and the potential of exclusion to deter wrongful police
conduct. Here the error was the result of isolated negligence attenuated from the arrest.
We hold that in these circumstances the jury should not be barred from considering all
the evidence.”149 In fact, in rejecting Herring’s argument that the exclusionary rule
should have barred introduction of the drugs and gun at his criminal trial, Justice Roberts
explained: “To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently
144

Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) and Pennsylvania
Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 363 (1998)).
145
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 698.
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deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the
exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in
some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case does not rise
to that level.”150 Later, the majority concluded: “In light of our repeated holdings that
the deterrent effect of suppression must be substantial and outweigh any harm to the
justice system . . . we conclude that when police mistakes are the result of negligence
such as that described here, rather than systemic error or reckless disregard of
constitutional requirements, any marginal deterrence does not ‘pay its way.’”151
In short, the Supreme Court has grown increasingly unreceptive to the
exclusionary rule and has enumerated several contexts in which it will not apply it, even
if the police gather evidence by violating the Constitution. In addition to the newlyannounced exception for “simple,” negligence, the exclusionary rule does not apply when
police obtain a warrant unsupported by probable cause but, nevertheless, search in good
faith reliance on the warrant.152 The rule does not preclude the government from using
illegally-obtained evidence in grand jury proceedings,153 and it does not prevent the
government from introducing evidence obtained in violation of the knock-and-announce
requirement of the Fourth Amendment,154 or from using evidence obtained in violation of
the Fourth or Sixth Amendment if the evidence is used to impeach a defendant’s trial
testimony.155 The Court has even held that evidence uncovered by the police pursuant to

150

Id. at 702 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 704 (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)).
152
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
153
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
154
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 593-94.
155
See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Kansas v. Ventris, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009).
151
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a search warrant obtained with an affidavit in which police have intentionally lied to
mislead the issuing magistrate judge does not necessarily require application of the
exclusionary rule.156
Even when the exclusionary rule would otherwise apply to preclude the use of
evidence seized in violation of the Constitution, the Court-made doctrines of “inevitable
discovery” and “attenuation” may save the evidence from suppression. As the Court held
in Nix v. Williams, evidence linked to illegality is admissible in a criminal trial if the
evidence would inevitably have been discovered through lawful means.157 Moreover, if
the Court finds that the “taint” of the illegality is so removed that it can be said to have
been “purged” by the amount of time passed or the circumstances following the illegality,
evidence will not be excluded in accordance with the exclusionary rule.158 As these
examples illustrate, even when the police have flagrantly violated a criminal defendant’s
constitutional rights and thereby intruded on her liberty, privacy or freedom, the Supreme
Court disfavors excluding evidence of the defendant’s factual guilt as a remedy for the
police’s wrongful conduct.
B.

The Supreme Court Implicitly Condones Some False Statements in
Affidavits Supporting Search and Arrest Warrants and Allows Police to
Lie about Their Reasons for Searching and Seizing.

156

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (holding that a search warrant obtained with an affidavit
containing false statements, which are knowingly or intentionally made, must be evaluated further before
evidence is excluded; only if the warrant lacks probable clause after the false information is excluded
should the warrant be voided and the evidence excluded).
157
467 U.S. 431 (1984).
158
See, e.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 491 (1963) (finding that despite unlawful arrest
made without probable cause, confession that followed was so unconnected that taint of illegal arrest had
been dissipated); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) (noting that “intervening events” can break
the causal connection between illegal arrest and confession and noting differences between Fourth
Amendment and Miranda violations).
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Franks v. Delaware159 illustrates that the Court
tolerates police lies in affidavits160 offered as justification for searches and seizures of
private spaces and people. In that case, Franks, who had been convicted of rape,
kidnapping, and burglary, challenged the veracity of statements in an affidavit used to
obtain a warrant authorizing a search of his home.161 For the first time, the Supreme
Court ruled that there is a limited right to challenge the veracity of a police affidavit, if
the challenger’s allegations are accompanied by an offer of proof (such as reliable
statements of witnesses), pinpointing specific portions of the affidavit that are knowingly
or intentionally false, or made with a reckless disregard for their truth.162
Franks is best known for permitting a challenge to the veracity of an officer’s
sworn statements in a warrant application. But the Franks decision is also remarkable for
its insight into the Court’s lack of concern with police lies. Franks suggests that the
Court views police lies in the suppression context as less significant than comparable lies
told by police in the trial context. In fact, in the suppression setting, the Court has
directed trial courts to presume that police are telling the truth. “There is, of course, a
presumption of validity with respect to the affidavit supporting the search warrant.”163 In
other words, the Court requires trial judges to presume that officers are truth telling when
they swear that there are sufficient grounds to intrude on a person’s Fourth Amendment
rights. Only if a defendant later establishes, with specific evidence, that the affidavit
contained deliberately-false information, or that information was included in the affidavit
159

438 U.S. 154 (1978).
Affidavits, of course, are statements made under oath, including statements made under penalty of
perjury.
161
Franks, 438 U.S. at 156-58.
162
Id. at 171. See also Kansas v. Mell, 39 Kan. App. 2d 471 (Kan. App. 2008) (interpreting Franks to
mean that a defendant challenging an affidavit must make a “ ‘substantial preliminary showing’ that a false
statement is included in the affidavit”).
163
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
160
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with a reckless disregard for its truth, is the defendant entitled to a hearing to further
probe the officer’s untruths.164 This presumption that all police tell the truth is also seen
in the Court’s precedent exploring the type and amount of evidence that suffices for a
showing of probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant. Although the
government must make a showing that non-police informants are worthy of belief and
that their information is likely to be reliable, the Court simply requires an assessment of
the sufficiency of the facts, not veracity, when an officer seeks a warrant based on his
own observations.165
Not only has the Supreme Court emphasized that police are presumed to tell the
truth when they provide sworn affidavits in support of a warrant, it has also explained
that even flagrant falsehoods in an affidavit do not require a judge to strike the affidavit
or suppress evidence obtained with it. Relying on a concession of the challenger in
Franks, the Court said, “[I]f what is left [in the affidavit after excising the false parts] is
sufficient to sustain probable cause, the inaccuracies are irrelevant[.]”166 Thus, in Franks,
the Court concluded that even when an officer lies about the factual basis for a warrant,
if, with the dishonest statements removed from the affidavit, the affidavit still supports a
finding of probable cause, then the evidence obtained with the warrant remains viable for
use at trial.167
The Franks decision provides officers with negligible incentives to include only
truthful statements in an affidavit. Every affidavit is presumed to be truthful, regardless

164

Id.
See, e.g., Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-31 (1983) (considering whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, an anonymous written tip was sufficiently corroborated by independent police investigation
to show sufficient reliability to support issuance of a warrant).
166
Franks, 438 U.S. at 172 n. 8.
167
Id.
165
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of how far-fetched its content. Only if a challenger to the warrant can find and introduce
specific and concrete evidence of the affiant’s dishonesty is the challenger entitled to
additional process (a hearing) to show that the warrant is invalid.168 The evidentiary
burden on such a challenger is significant, especially given the small likelihood that a
challenger will have access to evidence sufficient to demonstrate deceit by the police.
And even if the challenger could meet his burden, the affidavit is still sufficient support
for a warrant, as long as it is adequate without the false portions.
Isn’t the message of Franks that officers can lie, as long as they are careful not to
leave a trail and that even then, as long as the information in the affidavit supports a
search or seizure, a few extraneous lies won’t hurt the process? If that is not the intended
message of Franks, it is the consequence of its holding. And that consequence is
exacerbated by the fact that judges, who are tasked with deciding whether an affidavit
established probable cause minus the false portions, will be evaluating probable cause
with the hindsight that the search did, in fact, uncover evidence of illegality. Although a
judge may have been willing and able to judge the affidavit fairly and impartially before
the search, after a successful search, the judge will be biased (consciously or
unconsciously) toward finding probable cause. Moreover, the cases in which the officers
do not uncover evidence of illegality, the exclusionary rule provides no relief whatsoever
from their unconstitutional search.
Presumably, an officer’s lies would not meet with such indifference in a criminal
trial. At least at trial, the jury (or fact-finding judge) would not be asked to accept
portions of an officer’s testimony as presumptively correct, even after other portions had
been established as deliberately false. The jury would be told that it could disbelieve all
168

Id. at 171-72.
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or any part of a lying officer’s testimony.169 And it is human nature to doubt a witness’s
entire testimony if the witness has shown a willingness to lie, under oath, about some
things. If an advocate can establish that a witness has lied despite taking an oath to tell
the truth, a jury may conclude that the witness is lying about other aspects of her
testimony, even if there is no direct contradiction of those parts. Typical jury instructions
remind juries of this common-sense point. For instance, in the Eleventh Circuit, a jury
would be told: “You should also ask yourself whether there was evidence tending to
prove that a witness testified falsely concerning some important fact.”170
In addition to the Court’s decisions that reveal its tolerance for police lies in
affidavits supporting warrants,171 the Court’s precedent shows its indifference to police
lies about police motives for searching and seizing. In Whren v. United States,172 the
Supreme Court documented this indifference. The Court declared: “[Our] cases foreclose
any argument that the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual
motivations of the individual officers involved.”173 In other words, if there is probable
cause for an officer to search or seize, the search or seizure is constitutionally reasonable,
even if the officer who conducted the search lies about the reason he searched or seized in
the first place.174 An officer may have selected his searchee based on race, gender, size,

169

See Tenth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, Instruction 1.08 (2005) (instructing: “You are the
sole judges of the credibility or ‘believability’ of each witness and the weight to be given to the witness’s
testimony . . . You should think about the testimony of each witness . . . and decide whether you believe all
or any part of what each witness had to say”); Eleventh Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions,
Instruction 5 (2003) (instructing jury that “You should decide whether you believe what each witness had
to say, and how important that testimony was. In making that decision you may believe or disbelieve any
witness, in whole or in part.”).
170
Eleventh Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions, Instruction 6.1 (2003).
171
See discussion, supra at Section II.B, p. __.
172
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
173
Id. at 813.
174
See Bernard v. Ray, 246 Fed. Appx. 553 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished decision) (citing Whren and
holding that even if the FBI invented the informant “from whole cloth,” seatbelt violation furnished the
police with independent reasonable suspicion).
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number of tattoos, or any other arbitrary bias, as long as probable cause also existed for
the selection. As in the Franks setting, even if a judge might have decided before a
search or seizure that probable cause was lacking to support it, the judge’s post-hoc
review of such intrusions, which uncover evidence of illegality, will be swayed in favor
of a finding of reasonable cause for the search or seizure.
C.

The Court Allows Police to Gather Evidence Under False
Pretenses and to Lie to Obtain Confessions.

As indicated by Christopher Slobogin: “Undercover work is by definition
deceptive. It normally involves outright lies.”175 Although such police work is
synonymous with widespread deception, the Supreme Court permits police to engage in
it.176 The Court allows police to use deception and trickery in gathering evidence and in
urging confessions. Provided the police comply with their obligations to provide a
suspect with “Miranda” warnings before undertaking custodial interrogation and as long
as they avoid intrusion on a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel,177 officers
can tell at least a moderate number of material lies without jeopardizing the admissibility
of the resulting evidence or confession.178

175

Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies By the Police, 76 Or. L. Rev.
775, 778 (1997). A recent example of the effectiveness of such deception was reported in The New York
Times on October 22, 2008. The Times reported: “Dozens of members of the Mongol motorcycle gang
were arrested by federal agents in six states after a three-year undercover investigation in which four agents
infiltrated the group. More than 60 members of the gang, based in Southern California, were arrested under
a federal racketeering indictment that included charges of murder, attempted murder, assault, and gun and
drug violation[.]” Associated Press, Motorcycle Gang Members Arrested, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 2008, A15.
176
Id. (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206 (1966) and Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966)). See also William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1903,
1919-20 (1993) (noting that criminal law “is generally hospitable to deceptive tactics” in criminal
investigations “even when the defendant is represented by counsel” and even when the police tell “outright
lies” in the course of questioning a suspect).
177
See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
178
See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969)(indicating that misrepresentations by police during
an interrogation, “while relevant,” did not make confession involuntary). See also Welsh S. White, Police
Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 581, 582-83 (1979) (“Use of trickery or deceit in the
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D.

The Court Allows a Prosecutor to Withhold Exculpatory Evidence
Until After a Suppression Hearing; Therefore, Evidence Casting
Doubt on Police Credibility May Never Be Revealed and Police
Lies Are Encouraged by Other Trappings of Pretrial Proceedings.

Although a suppression hearing can set the tone, if not alleviate the need, for a
criminal trial, the Court’s precedent does not require prosecutors to give defendants
evidence relevant to the impeachment of police-officer witnesses until after the
suppression-hearing-stage of a case.179 According to the Court, the goal of the
suppression hearing is not to decide guilt or innocence; therefore, a prosecutor is not
obligated to provide “Brady” material at that stage of the process.180
The Supreme Court has said that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide
the factual question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.181 Because guilt or innocence
is a pivotal question, in Giglio v. United States,182 the Court expressly acknowledged the
importance of evidence indicating the reliability or unreliability of a witness who
contributes to the jury’s ultimate declaration of guilt. The Court recognized that a trial
witness’s credibility “may well be determinative of guilt or innocence,” and, therefore,
impeachment evidence, which is material183 and suppressed by the prosecution, requires a
new trial.184 A new trial is required whether or not the prosecutor withholds material
impeachment evidence in good or bad faith.185 And, evidence, which has a reasonable

questioning of criminal suspects is a staple of current police interrogation practices . . . . [And] [t]he Court
has neither held nor even indicated that any particular type of police trickery would, in and of itself, render
a resulting confession inadmissible.”).
179
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70 (1970).
180
Id.
181
Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986).
182
405 U.S. 150 (1972).
183
The Court assessed materiality by asking whether the evidence “could . . . in any reasonable likelihood
have affected the judgment of the jury[.]” Id. at 154. (ellipsis original).
184
Id. at 154.
185
Id. at 153.
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probability of changing the result in a criminal case, must be disclosed to a defendant
whether or not the defendant asks for the information.186
The Court’s Brady/Giglio precedent underscores how central lies can be to the
accurate outcome of a criminal trial.187 Nevertheless, this important protection against
lies, even police lies, does not apply pre-trial.188 As a result, a defendant may plead
guilty and relinquish all the rights that accompany a trial, including the right to produce
evidence in her defense, the right to have a jury decide her case, the right to insist that the
government establish her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and other protections against
wrongful convictions, without having received any information from the government
about the impeachability of the government’s witnesses or other evidence contained in
the government’s files that casts doubt on her factual guilt.189
Because many of the procedural rules for pretrial hearings are more relaxed than
the procedural rules that apply during trial, the hearing context is a safer place for the
police to tell lies. Unlike full trials, pre-trial hearings are unaccompanied by jury scrutiny
and a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt burden of proof. Suppression hearings also are
conducted with relaxed rules of evidence; yet, defense lawyers have to jump through
burdensome hoops to call certain law enforcement officers as witnesses.
186

See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995).
The ability to receive information and evidence of certain lies, for instance lies that frame an innocent
defendant for possessing contraband, is crucial to fairness at any stage of a criminal case. If such
information were available pretrial, it could prevent a defendant from being detained in jail while awaiting
trial and could avoid other consequences of criminal prosecution, such as job loss and community
condemnation. But arguably, evidence of some police lies, for instance those that provide a constitutional
basis for a search that, in fact, violated the Constitution, do not necessarily deprive a defendant of a fair
determination of his guilt or innocence. If the criminal process is designed only to accurately determine the
factual guilt or innocence of a defendant charged with a crime, see Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. at 577, then
failure to provide the defendant with information about lies irrelevant to his guilt or innocence does not
undermine the process.
188
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1997).
189
See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630 (2002) (noting that it is “difficult” to characterize
impeachment information as critical information that a defendant must have before pleading guilty and that
the Constitution does not require “complete knowledge of the relevant circumstances” before a plea).
187
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The Sixth Amendment, which guarantees a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury,190 was enacted to protect defendants from the whims and overreaching of the
government, including judges.191 But there is no jury protection at the pretrial stage of a
criminal case. Similarly, the protection afforded defendants at trial from the beyond-adoubt burden of proof is lacking at the pre-trial stage. “[E]ven if a question of credibility
is raised during a pre-trial suppression hearing, the prosecution must show only that its
version of the facts is more likely than not, a standard that invites, at most, mild judicial
scrutiny.”192 As long as the prosecution presents a modicum of evidence that its
witnesses are telling the truth and that it has a modest amount of evidence of guilt, the
government will meet its preponderance burden, and the defendant will face a trial or a
plea. If the prosecution had “to prove the credibility of its witnesses beyond a reasonable
doubt in order to prove probable cause to search, no doubt the judge-as-factfinder would
feel constrained to scrutinize the witness' reliability more carefully.”193
In addition to the lenient standard of proof that applies pretrial, the rules of
evidence are significantly relaxed. Hearsay and other uncorroborated testimony is
normally more than adequate to convince the magistrate judge that there is a fair
probability that a crime was committed and that the defendant was involved. Because the
evidentiary standards are relaxed, a police officer with outstanding credibility can appear
and testify to all the evidence she heard second-hand from other officers, some of whom
may be notorious for “fudging” the truth.194 Officers, who might be easily impeached or
190

U.S. const. amend. VI.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155-56 (1986).
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David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 455, 468 (1999)
(hereinafter “Proving the Lie”).
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Id.
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See F. R. Evid. 1101(d) (3)(making the Rules of Evidence inapplicable in “preliminary examinations in
criminal cases,” thus, allowing officers to testify from hearsay accounts of other officers). n my experience
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exposed for lying, are protected from testifying, at least in the federal system, because a
defendant’s lawyer must get permission to call officer witnesses.195
Moreover, unlike jurors, who probably give no thought to the matter at all, judges
know that credibility assessments “are reviewed on appeal only for an abuse of
discretion.”196 Because their credibility judgments are given significant deference on
appeal, reversed only when the judge has committed an obvious mistake, “judges do not
experience the same fear of committing reversible error when weighing accuracy and
believability of testimony,”197 as they do when making the correct ruling on a matter of
law. In addition, in the pre-trial setting, judges have weak incentives to find that the
police have lied. When they evaluate credibility pretrial, they know that the vast majority
of their rulings will not be reviewed at all, even under the deferential standard. Most
criminal cases are resolved through pre-trial pleas. These cases never reach trial, let
alone appellate review. In fact, in many cases, the judges are weighing the credibility of
the police while simultaneously hearing about the extensive evidence of the defendant’s
wrongdoing and illegality, which was exposed during the case. These factors, taken
together, make the likelihood of reversal on credibility rulings exceedingly small.
Although statistics are currently unavailable to show how many trial-level judges
tend to favor the testimony of officers over the testimony of defendants or the witnesses
offered by defendants, when credibility is in doubt, there are additional incentives for
these judges to make credibility findings in favor of the government. Many judges face
as a federal prosecutor, it was not uncommon for “Giglio-impaired” officers to continue to assist in
investigations, the execution of warrants, and the apprehension of suspects. But those officers, whose
credibility was subject to effective impeachment, did not appear as hearing or trial witnesses.
195
See, e.g., Young v. United States, 181 F.R.D. 344, 347-48 (1997) (recognizing that federal employees
may be required to obtain the permission of their employing agencies before testifying against the United
States in federal court).
196
Dorfman, Proving the Lie, supra note 192, at 467.
197
Id. at 468-698.
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difficult elections. If they can be characterized as “soft on crime” for allowing “guilty”
defendants to go free because they have excluded otherwise relevant evidence, they may
be defeated in such elections. Even if a judge does not face such contested elections,
there may be other public pressures against the suppression of evidence.
The pressure applied to Harold Baer, a federal district judge with a long and
distinguished record, illustrates this point. Judge Baer was nearly impeached in the
1990’s after he refused to admit eighty pounds of drugs in a New York City case against
Carol Bayless.198 Reportedly, prominent politicians, including President Bill Clinton and
Senator Bob Dole “beat up on” Baer in an effort to “burnish their law-and-order
credentials.”199 Furthermore, unless the evidence of police dishonesty is overwhelming,
judges do not want to tarnish or ruin the careers of police officers, who may be “good
people,” “hard working,” and frequent witnesses in the judge’s courtroom.200
E. The Court’s Desire for Truth and Its Prohibition of Perjury Is One-sided,
Favoring the Government
In its opinions, the Supreme Court has regularly declared the importance of truthseeking in criminal cases and its disdain for perjury.201 But in practice, the imperative of
truth appears to be a one-sided coin. Heads, the government wins. Tails, the defendant
loses.
Recently, in Kansas v. Ventris, the Court held that the government could use
evidence gathered in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment “Massiah” rights to
198

See United States v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (granting defendant’s motion to
suppress based on finding that officers lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct investigatory stop).
199
Op. Ed, Judge Baer’s Exit, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1996; Julian E. Barnes, Prison Term for Woman in
Disputed Drug Case, N.Y. Times, Oct. 2, 1998 (indicating that the Clinton Administration suggested that
Baer might be asked to resign if he did not change his ruling on suppression). Eventually, Judge Baer
capitulated. See United States v. Bayless, 921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (vacating prior decision).
200
This observation is my own and that of other friends and colleagues who have been prosecutors in the
federal system.
201
See supra, note 10.
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impeach the defendant’s inconsistent trial testimony.202 On its way to reaching this
result, the Court offered its customary, truth-based rationale:
Our precedents make clear that the game of excluding tainted evidence for
impeachment purposes is not worth the candle. The interests safeguarded
by such exclusion are “outweighed by the need to prevent perjury and to
assure the integrity of the trial process.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
488 . . . (1976). “It is one thing to say that the Government cannot make an
affirmative use of evidence unlawfully obtained. It is quite another to say
that the defendant can . . . provide himself with a shield against
contradiction of his untruths.” Walder [v. United States, 347 U.S. 62
(1954)]. Once the defendant testifies in a way that contradicts prior
statements, denying the prosecution use of “the traditional truth-testing
devices of the adversary process,” . . . is a high price to pay for vindication
of the right to counsel at the prior stage.203
Many Court cases incorporate these lofty phrases that appear to emphasize the
value of truth in the American criminal justice system.204 In Herring v. United States, the
Court noted the “costly toll upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives” created
by the exclusionary rule.205 In Oregon v. Hass, the Court allowed the government to
impeach a defendant with statements he made after the police violated his Miranda
rights, reasoning:
“the impeaching material would provide valuable aid to the jury in
assessing the defendant's credibility . . . [T]he shield provided by Miranda
is not to be perverted to a license to testify inconsistently, or even
perjuriously, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances. We are, after all, always engaged in a search for truth in a
criminal case . . . .”206
In practice, however, the Court’s demand for truth in the criminal process is
slanted in a way that especially targets criminal defendants. The Court’s precedent and
the procedural rules that support that precedent are more indifferent, if not accepting, of
202

Kansas v. Ventris, __ U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1841 (2009).
Id. See also Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344 (1990).
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police lies, even those that distort the truth about a suspect’s allegedly criminal conduct
and an officer’s seemingly unconstitutional or wrongful behavior.207 Why the double
standard? Probably because a majority of the Court worries that application of the
exclusionary rule will result in the release of guilty and dangerous defendants. As the
Court said in United States v. Payner:208 “Our cases have consistently recognized that
unbending application of the exclusionary sanction to enforce ideals of governmental
rectitude would impede unacceptably the truth-finding functions of judge and jury. . . .
After all, it is the defendant, and not the constable, who stands trial.” In other words, a
majority of the Court believes that when a defendant lies, he distorts the truth about his
guilt, but when a police officer lies, he may be doing so to ensure that the truth is told
about the same defendant’s guilt.

III.

The Proposal – An Exclusionary Rule Tailored to Reduce and Punish TruthDistorting Lies
Innocent mistakes by the police can result in inaccurate case outcomes, but truth-

distorting police lies are worse. Arguably, they are more likely than mere mistakes to
result in wrongful convictions, and they also lead to all of the negative collateral
consequences described in Part I.B. Police lies are also different from police errors
because some of them – truth exposing lies – are “good lies” that promote the primary
goal of our system – to foster the truth-seeking function of identifying the guilty and
distinguishing them from the innocent. Other police lies, however, undermine that aim.
These are “bad lies” that in a perfect world would be eliminated. Although the Supreme

207

See discussion of Franks, supra at __ and Payner, infra at __,
447 U.S. 727, 734 (1980). In Payner, the Court relied on notions of “standing” to reject application of
the exclusionary rule, even for intentional violations of constitutional rights.
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Court expressly permits some police lies and quietly tolerates others, it has made no
attempt to explain its different treatment of the two groups. Part III distinguishes
between “good” police lies and “bad” ones, and it urges a modification to the existing
exclusionary rule to reduce the number of “bad” ones police tell.

A. Distinguishing Truth-Exposing Lies From Lies That Distort and Conceal
Truth
This section distinguishes between two kinds of police lies: (1) Those that expose
the truth about criminal conduct; and (2) Those that conceal the truth about criminal or
unconstitutional behavior. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the Supreme Court
treats the first type in a way that supports the core goals of a fair criminal justice system.
The Article finds fault, however, with the Court’s handling of the second type – those
police lies that conceal the truth about criminal acts. Because the Article argues for a
different treatment of the second category, this section explains the difference between
the two groups and provides specific examples of police misconduct that would fall
within each category. Ultimately, this Section distinguishes between police lies that the
Court should expressly permit and those that the Court should openly prohibit. The
distinctions drawn in Sections 1 and 2 are offered to show that there are meaningful and
identifiable differences in the two types of lies and that those differences require different
applications of the exclusionary rule.
1. Police Lies That Expose the Truth and Criminal Conduct
“The ends justify the means.”209 This adage probably best characterizes why
most police lies are told. It also explains the Supreme Court’s hostility to the

209

The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations attributes this saying to Hermann Busenbaum, a German
theologian. The Oxford Dictionary of Quotations, Ed. Elizabeth Knowles, Oxford University Press (2004),
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exclusionary rule. After all, if the point of the American criminal justice system is to
ensure that the guilty are promptly convicted and proportionally punished and that the
not-guilty are quickly exonerated and freed from any intrusion on their liberty or smear
on their reputations, then the system should tolerate any and all lies that ensure these
laudable ends. There are two types of police lies that fit this description: (1) Lies told by
officers that are necessary for undercover investigations; and (2) Lies told by officers
urging the guilty to confess the truth about their crimes. Because the ends of justice
justify these lies, they should be openly accepted by society, and they are properly
protected by Supreme Court precedent.210
a. Lies Necessary for Undercover Operations
Sometimes police lie to expose the truth about clandestine criminal enterprises
that operate over the Internet or from other increasingly secure distances and unknown
locations away from officers and public places. Police could not penetrate some criminal
organizations or solve some crimes without dishonesty. Crimes involving human
trafficking and the solicitation of minors for sex are but two examples of the types of
criminal activity that could not effectively be investigated and exposed without police
lies. Of equal importance, these lies expose the truth about the guilt or innocence of
those suspected of such criminal behaviors.

available at http://www.oxfordeference.com/views/ENTRY.html?entry=t115. Literally, the phrase means,
“When the end is allowed, the means also are allowed.” Id.
210
Although not described in these terms, William Stuntz has also asserted that deceptive tactics used by
the government in criminal investigations, including during undercover ruses and while interrogating
suspects, not only harms guilty defendants but also “probably help[s] innocent ones.” William J. Stuntz,
Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 Va. L. Rev. 1903, 1921 (1993).
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Human trafficking is growing in popularity in the United States,211 and it is a
highly clandestine crime, which by definition, often goes unreported. Those who commit
crimes of human trafficking often are associated with international criminal
organizations. Because of these international ties, human traffickers are difficult to
identify and harder still to find. In addition, victims are usually afraid to cooperate with
authorities or they are too young to assist. They fear for themselves and, more
commonly, their family members, who often are in another country, home to the
trafficker. One of the most effective ways to expose these deplorable crimes is for police
to assume false personas and to lie about their willingness to participate in the crime.
Once in the confidences of the traffickers, police learn the truth about the nature and
breadth of the operation, and they can sometimes disrupt it, or reduce its effectiveness.
The same is true of police guises to catch adults who trawl the Internet for minors,
soliciting them for sex acts.212 To expose the truth about who is engaging in these
solicitations and who intends to follow through and act on them, the police lie to gain
access to communications initiated from intensely private spaces, such as a home. They
enter public areas using the Internet and lie about their identities and ages, and when
police are solicited in violation of federal law, they engage in further deception to
guarantee that the suspect not only thinks about criminal behavior, but also that he (or
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Between 2001 and 2005, the U.S. Department of Justice identified 555 people suspected of committing
human trafficking violations. See United States Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics (Oct.
2006), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/fpht05.htm Many human trafficking violations
involve the sex trafficking of women and children. Congress viewed this crime to be so serious and
common that in 2000, it passed the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protections Act, which enhanced
pre-existing penalties for those convicted and offers more rights to victims of these crimes. See Pub. L.
106-386 (Oct. 28, 2000).
212
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).
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occasionally she) intends to act on those thoughts. These police lies are necessary to, and
effective at, revealing the truth about a defendant’s guilt or innocence.213
In addition, this type of police deception is tempered, and defendants further
protected from wrongful conviction, by the defense of “entrapment.” In essence,
entrapment asserts that the government induced the defendant to commit a crime that he
would not have otherwise committed.214 “[A] finding of entrapment does more than
result in the exclusion of evidence at trial – it bars the successful prosecution of the
defendant.”215
Thus, police lies told to garner the confidence and acceptance of those suspected
of criminal behavior, so that the suspects’ behavior can be fully and fairly evaluated as
indicative of guilt or innocence, are lies told to expose the truth. These truth-exposing
lies are “acceptable” lies that the Supreme Court should and does permit.216 They are
acceptable because the ends of justice are served and factual guilt and innocence is
exposed with them.
b. Lies Urging Factually Guilty Suspects to Admit Their Conduct

213

And see Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, supra note 210, at 1930 (an advantage of
undercover deception is it “gives the defendant who truthfully maintains his innocence some additional
leverage. At the least, it makes his claims marginally more credible”).
214
Joshua Dressler and Alan C. Michaels, Understanding Criminal Procedure, Fourth Edition (2006), at
571.
215
Joshua Dressler and Alan C. Michaels, Understanding Criminal Procedure, Fourth Edition (2006), at
571. Christopher Slobogin has argued that the entrapment defense, along with the Due Process Clause, and
the Sixth Amendment (as interpreted in Massiah), provide some protection against unwarranted undercover
operations, but he also finds these protections inadequate. See Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext and
Trickery: Investigative Lies by the Police, 76 Or. L. Rev. 775, 780 (1997).
216
See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 300 (1990) (affirming a conviction based on a confession resting
on lies to a suspect by an undercover officer); United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 445 (1973) (noting
that the government’s use of undercover acts and deception is not necessarily unlawful); Jackson v. Denno,
378 U.S. 368, 425 n.2 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting) (reiterating that “the fact that a confession was
procured by the employment of some artifice or deception does not exclude the confession . . . if the artifice
or deception was not calculated to procure an untrue statement); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 542
(1961) (same). Slobogin also contends that these “active” police lies told during undercover ruses are not
justifiable. See Deceit, Pretext and Trickery, 76 Or. L. Rev. at 808-809.
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The second type of police lie that exposes truth is the lie that convinces a guilty
suspect to admit his conduct. The Supreme Court has expressly sanctioned such lies,217
and the Court’s precedent is defensible because the ends of justice warrant this deception.
As Justice Scalia expressed in his dissent in Minnick v. Mississippi:
[I]t is wrong, and subtly corrosive of our criminal justice system, to regard
an honest confession as a “mistake.” While every person is entitled to
stand silent, it is more virtuous for the wrongdoer to admit his offense and
accept the punishment he deserves. Not only for society, but for the
wrongdoer himself, “admissio[n] of guilt ..., if not coerced, [is] inherently
desirable,” . . . because it advances the goals of both “justice and
rehabilitation[.]”218
Because a voluntary confession can expose details of a crime, which would otherwise
remain undetectable and unsolved, confessions are important evidence of guilt. And lies
that urge suspects to speak honestly about their conduct should be encouraged.219
Of course, we now know that police lies in this context must be carefully
regulated so that police do not unduly pressure a defendant to say that he committed a
crime when he did not. Although at first it might seem unlikely that a suspect would lie
and implicate himself, we know from the first two-hundred DNA exonerations that
innocent people occasionally confess to crimes that they did not commit.
There is a natural check on this category of police lies – the non-public details of
the crime. Even if the police lie to a suspect, telling him that they know he committed the
crime because his finger prints are on the murder weapon, his shoe print is at the scene,
his accomplice “gave him up,” and the victim picked him out of the line up, the police
217

See Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (police used undercover officer and trickery to convince
defendant to confess); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (police lied to defendant’s attorney about
when the interrogation would take place and failed to tell the defendant of his attorney’s attempt to reach
and represent defendant during the interrogation).
218
Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166-67(1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
219
But see Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 Conn. L. Rev. 425, 476
(1996) (arguing that police lies during interrogations “can impede evidence gathering by generating distrust
and suspicion which limit citizen cooperation and by obtaining or creating false evidence.”).
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will know whether the confession is genuine or merely contrived in response to the lies.
The specific, factual details of the crime will verify or refute the suspect’s actual
involvement. The key is that police must never “feed” a suspect the details of the
crime.220 This is the line between police lies that uncover truth and those that distort it.
If an officer provides a suspect with factual details to flesh out a confession, the officer
must never lie about what details he gave. Lying about these aspects of the interview
would either require the officer to perjure himself later in court or to falsify the police
report telling what happened in the interrogation room. Courts must not sanction any lies
in the police report. Likewise, at any subsequent court proceedings, the system must
demand that police forthrightly admit the specifics of any deception they use. To the
extent that police lie or conceal the words and actions really used to obtain a confession,
the lies fall within the second category of police lies, discussed below, those that conceal
and distort the truth.
Numerous legal scholars have argued that police should be required or
encouraged to record their interviews of suspects.221 Especially if the exclusionary rule is
modified so that police lies amounting to simple trickery are openly and expressly
permitted, there will be more reason for the police to willingly record these interviews
and greater incentives for courts to impose legal obligations on the police to do so. If
officers know that they will not be penalized for lying to suspects, as long as their lies do
not taint the truth of the confession, they should be more willing to record the police220

See findings of Garrett, supra Part I.A.(6).
See, e.g., Richard A. Leo, Steven A. Drizin, Peter J. Neufeld, Bradley R. Hall, and Amy Vatner,
Bringing Reliability Back In: False Confessions and Legal Safeguards in the Twenty-first Century, 2006
Wis. L. R. 479, 486, 522-25 (2006); Thomas P. Sullivan, Electronic Recording of Custodial Interrogations:
Everybody Wins, 95 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 1127, 1127-28 (2005); Gail Johnson, False
Confessions and Fundamental Fairness: The Need for Electronic Recordings of Custodial Interrogations, 6
B.U. Pub. L.J. 719, 741 (1997).
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suspect interactions and less concerned about allowing judges and the public to see and
hear that the truth was told because of savvy police work, not undue pressure or unfair
influence.
The line is clear and bright between police lies told to a suspect to encourage
truth-telling and, in contrast, those that distort the circumstances under which the
confession was acquired. Every officer should be expected to understand the obvious and
significant difference and be held to account for his or her conduct and lies. If the law
draws this distinction, (expressly recognizing the difference between these two types of
lies), officers will be reminded of the importance of catching the real criminal, not
apprehending a suspect who did not have the fortitude to withstand police pressure. If a
defendant is unable to provide specific details about where and how the crime was
committed, police, juries, prosecutors, and judges should be wary of the accuracy of the
confession. Especially if there is little or no corroborating evidence of the defendant’s
guilt, a judge should readily exclude those confessions as unreliable. In other words, in
doubtful cases, the benefit of the doubt should go to the defendant whose life and liberty
are in jeopardy.
Moreover, police should approach a suspect’s confession with the same
skepticism that they approach a cooperating witness’s claims that she knows who
committed a crime and can, therefore, assist in solving the crime in exchange for leniency
on a criminal charge or for monetary compensation. The police rarely take a cooperator’s
claims at face value.222 They search for corroborating evidence that either supports the
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Some states require corroboration of the story of a cooperating witness. See State v. Johnson, 261 Neb.
1001, 1012 (2001) (prohibiting the prosecution of controlled substance offenses without corroboration of a
cooperating witness). See also Daniel Richman, Expanding the Evidentiary Frame for Cooperating
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claim or suggests that the cooperator’s story is invented to point suspicion away from
herself or for some other self-interested reason, such as financial gain.
In sum, police who lie to encourage guilty suspects to admit the truth about their
criminal behavior are justified by the goal of identifying the guilty. On the other hand,
police lies that conceal or distort the truth about a defendant’s knowledge of the nonpublic details of a crime are unjustified because these lies distort truth about factual guilt.
Because these two types of lies require different exclusionary treatment, the exclusionary
rule must be modified to more effectively deter the unacceptable lies and expressly allow
the acceptable ones. If persuasive evidence is presented, either at a pretrial hearing or
later at trial, that the police revealed publically-unavailable information to a suspect as a
means to obtain a confession, the exclusionary rule should exclude the resulting
confession from use at the suspect’s trial.223
Occasionally, the police may not lie to the suspect at all but may, instead, pressure
the suspect into lying about his criminal activity and then provide the suspect with nonpublic information that makes his confession appear more plausible. This might happen,
for instance, when an officer becomes convinced that the suspect “did it,” and in an effort
to prove that guilt, the officer “feeds” the suspect information to support the confession.
Technically, in this instance, the police have not lied; they made a mistake. Importantly,
though, the mistake pressured the suspect into lying. Because this resulting lie is just as
disruptive to an effective criminal justice system as is the police lie with scienter, both
should result in exclusion of the resulting confession. Essentially, the police have lied
Witnesses, 23 Cardozo L. Rev. 893, 894 (2002) (the standard “cooperator trial” includes the prosecutor
“pointing to all the corroboration of the cooperator’s testimony”).
223
For reasons detailed later in the paper, this exclusion of the resulting confession should apply to the
government’s case-in-chief and for purposes of impeachment because the circumstances under which the
confession is obtained calls into doubt the accuracy of the admission.
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through a surrogate. This police misconduct falls within category two, discussed
immediately below.
2. Police Lies That Distort or Conceal Criminal or Unconstitutional
Behavior
In contrast to lies that police tell as an undercover ruse or to convince a defendant
to admit his factual guilt – lies that expose the truth about criminal conduct -- there are
numerous police lies that distort the truth or conceal the fact that the government violated
someone’s constitutional rights. This section discusses how such truth-distorting police
lies are meaningfully different from the first category. Ultimately, this Article contends
that the Supreme Court should modify the exclusionary rule to deter these lies. The
modification is necessary to significantly reduce the incentives for police to tell these lies.
The most obvious type of a police lie that distorts the truth is a lie that frames an
innocent person. An example can be found in Section I.A.3, supra. There, Atlanta’s
Officer Tesler lied to make it look like an elderly woman was keeping illegal drugs in her
home and told more lies claiming that the woman was killed trying to defend the drugs.224
In reality, Tesler was covering for two other officers who had obtained a search warrant
with fictitious information.225 All three officers lied to excuse the killing of the innocent
woman and to conceal their other unconstitutional behavior. Reasonable grounds never
existed to believe that drugs were in the woman’s house or that she was involved in drug
sales.226 To cover the unconstitutional entry, illegal search, and unjustified shooting, one
of the officers planted drugs in the woman’s home.227
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A second type of police lie that distorts the truth is a lie told by police to create a
post-hoc justification for their unlawful intrusion on someone’s constitutional rights. For
instance, police may search or seize a suspect or his belongings, knowing that they had
insufficient grounds, making the search or seizure unlawful. As discussed in the
introduction to this Article, Los Angeles police officers told truth-distorting lies at trial
when they testified falsely that they found drug evidence abandoned by a suspect as he
ran.228 Similarly, the New York officer discussed in Section I.A.2., lied and distorted the
truth about a Fourth Amendment search when he falsely testified that he could see drugs
in a suspect’s car and only after seeing them in plain view, did he decide to search the car
and seize the drugs.229
Officers who falsely claim that a defendant has consented to a search also tell
truth-distorting lies, as do police who convince a suspect to confess by divulging to the
suspect intimate facts of a crime that only the perpetrator would know, wearing down an
innocent person.
A third example of police lies that distort the truth can be found in cases like
Franks, discussed in Section II.B. In these cases, officers believe that a suspect is
committing a crime. They become intent on proving their belief, but they lack sufficient
evidence to convince others that they are correct. As a result, they cut corners. They
proffer evidence, which, if true, would convince a neutral and detached magistrate judge
that there is probable cause to believe that evidence will be found in a specific place or
that a certain person has committed a crime. With a fabricated version of events, they

228
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conceal their lack of real evidence and ask a judge to issue a search warrant or an arrest
warrant.
These are just a few examples of police lies that tell a story different from the
reality of what the officer actually did or saw, different from what a suspect said and did,
or slants the reality in some other way. None of the lies exposes the truth about a
suspect’s criminal conduct. None of the lies protects constitutional rights. Each, instead,
represents a post-hoc justification for conduct that an individual officer wants to validate
or excuse.
Currently, the incentives for police officers to tell these types of truth-concealing
lies are strong and the disincentives equally weak. For example, as long as an officer, in
a semi-convincing way, “fudges” his testimony to provide a plausible explanation for his
otherwise unconstitutional actions, he can avoid the exclusionary rule that would exclude
the use of the evidence from the government’s case-in-chief.230 So, if an officer searched
a suspect based on an unsupportable hunch, but that hunch paid off because the search
revealed evidence of a crime, the officer has a strong incentive to lie and provide a
legitimate justification, beyond the truthful hunch, that would have legally permitted the
search. Unless the law changes these inducements, police will continue to lie in some
cases to avoid application of the exclusionary rule. As discussed in Section I.B., such lies
have both direct and indirect damaging effects on our criminal justice system, and more
should be done to eliminate them.
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This is true because the standard of proof in this stage of the case is a mere preponderance of the
evidence, United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 178 n. 14 (1974) (suppression hearings require only
proof by a preponderance of evidence), and because even a pretextual search or seizure can be saved by a
lawful explanation. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
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The modification to the exclusionary rule proposed in Section III.C., below, seeks
to tailor the current rule to encourage honest police work and to create stronger
motivation for officers to honestly admit their misconduct, thereby promoting the core
aims of a fair criminal system. The proposal urges a broader use of the exclusionary rule
in cases in which a trial judge suspects the police of telling truth-distorting lies and a
narrower application of the rule in cases in which officers forthrightly admit that they
may have violated a suspect’s constitutional rights in an effort to “catch the bad guy.”
B. As Is, the Exclusionary Rule Does Not Discourage Truth-Distorting Police
Lies.
The Supreme Court already properly tolerates police lies that seek to uncover the
truth about a suspect’s criminal behavior. For good reason, the Court neither punishes
officers nor suppresses evidence, when an officer works undercover using a false identity,
even if the officer repeatedly tells lies, sometimes elaborate ones, about his own motives
and conduct. These lies are justified because they uncover the truth about crimes a
suspect has or has not committed. Moreover when an officer takes the stand as a witness
later in the course of the prosecution and testifies about his behavior and deception, he
candidly admits his lies, under oath, before judge and jury.
The same is true when the police lie and tell a suspect that his co-conspirator is
next door confessing and implicating him, or when they say that they have tested the
murder weapon and found the suspect’s fingerprints. These lies also result in a suspect
admitting the truth about whether or not he engaged in criminal conduct. Like the lies an
officer tells while conducting undercover surveillance, an officer who lies to trick a
suspect into admitting criminal conduct later testifies honestly in pretrial hearings and at
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trial, explaining what really happened. Because he testifies truthfully, both judge and
jury can assess whether or not the officer’s lies went too far and coerced a confession.
The Supreme Court has never sought to deter these types of police lies and
rightfully so.231 Whether the Court would justify them in this way, the lies are consistent
with the core values of our criminal system of justice, which seeks to expose the truth
about criminal behaviors and to separate the innocent from the guilty.
In contrast to its proper treatment of truth-revealing police lies, the Court has sent
the wrong message and created the wrong incentives for police who lie to conceal the
truth about criminal conduct and officers’ breaches of constitutional rights. If the system
were changed to alter officers’ perceptions of the value of truth-concealing lies – to their
careers, to reducing crime, to convicting the bad guys – logic suggests that many, if not
most, of these lies would stop. Several legal scholars have offered suggestions about how
to change the current system to stem incentives for the police to lie. Donald A. Dripps
has argued for polygraphing police under some circumstances.232 David Dorfman
contends that prosecutors should have increasingly burdensome discovery obligations
and that defense lawyers need greater opportunities for cross examination.233 Bennett
Capers asserts that officers should be prosecuted more often for perjury.234 Christopher
Slobogin has offered multiple proposals to reduce the wide-spread problem.235
Each of these proposals holds allure, given that the current system has proven
ineffective at significantly reducing unwanted police lies. This portion of the Article
231

This is true as long as the deception does not render the resulting confession “involuntary.” See Spano
v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959).
232
See Donald A. Dripps, Police, Plus Perjury, Equals Polygraphy, 86 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 693
(1996).
233
See David N. Dorfman, Proving the Lie: Litigating Police Credibility, 26 Am. J. Crim. L. 455 (1999).
234
I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 Ind. L.J. 835 (2008).
235
Christopher Slobogin, Testilying, Police Perjury and What to Do About It, 67 U. Colo. L. Rev. 1037
(1996).
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offers an alternative procedural solution to capture some of the benefits of the previous
suggestions, while furthering two central goals of the Bill of Rights: (1) To protect “the
people” against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government, as provided in the
Fourth Amendment;236 and (2) To ensure the protections of a citizen jury, whose job it is
to make sure the government establishes each element of a charged crime by a beyond-areasonable doubt standard, as mandated by the Sixth Amendment.237
Because the Supreme Court’s current application of the exclusionary rule rests on
the tacit, but incorrect, premise that police officers are impartial, fact-gatherers who
rarely lie and seldom mislead judges and juries about the actual happenings in a criminal
case, the Court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence is undermining core guarantees of our
supposedly rational and constitutionally-based system of justice. In fact, we now know
that the Court’s current version of the exclusionary rule has failed to adequately prevent
truth-distorting police lies and has led to substantive errors about defendants’ factual
guilt.
The exclusionary rule should be modified to provide additional oversight by trial
judges and, more importantly, juries, who can critically evaluate whether evidence should
be excluded as a sanction for suspected police lies and, correspondingly, misconduct
concealed by those lies. Not only do citizen juries serve the Framers’ desire for checks
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See amend. IV (guaranteeing “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .”).
237
In relevant part, the Sixth Amendment provides: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed[.]” The Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Sixth Amendment to confer a
constitutional right to: 1) a jury determination on each element of a crime, and 2) proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230 (2005) (noting that the Constitution
“gives a criminal defendant the right to demand that a jury find him guilty of all the elements of the crime
with which he is charged”); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (indicating that the government must
“convince the trier [of fact] of all the essential elements of guilt”) (citations omitted).
239
See proposal of David Dorfman, supra note. 233.

61
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1348118

on the government’s power, but also citizen juries are better-positioned to reflect the
diverse citizenry in America, giving a voice to groups underrepresented in the judiciary.
Also, a jury is better-positioned than judges or others to reject the police culture of lies.
Juries serve on a one-time basis and are, therefore, not faced with the same pressure to
overlook lies told by police or tolerated by prosecutors who often work together and who
regularly appear in the same courtroom with the same judge. Encouraging more jury
input would infuse more police accountability into the current system, especially if the
change was implemented in combination with some of the other proposals already
offered by scholars – for example, additional opportunities for discovery and cross
examination,239 and more frequent perjury prosecutions for officers who appear to lie
under oath.240
The exclusionary rule should be tailored to strengthen those aspects that have
proven ineffective at reducing truth-distorting police lies and simultaneously changed to
loosen the grip on police lies that reveal actual criminal conduct. More probing oversight
from well-educated and politically-responsive judges and citizen juries, who are wellpositioned to determine when the Fourth Amendment reasonableness requirement has
been violated and when police behaviors have unduly overcome the will of a citizen
suspect, will give the current system more checks and balances and foster the aims of the
Framers of the Bill of Rights, who sought to protect citizens’ and suspects’ liberty and
privacy through oversight of a citizen jury.
Although occasionally still debated, the consensus appears to be that the
exclusionary rule deters police (at least some of the time) from knowingly or

240

See proposal of I. Bennett Capers, supra note 234.
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intentionally violating a citizen’s constitutional rights.241 Because the police know that a
judge might exclude illegally-obtained evidence from a defendant’s trial as a remedy for
a breach of the defendant’s constitutional rights, many or most police officers tend to be
more cautious about violating those rights. On the other hand, the exclusionary rule may
often encourage police to lie to conceal such a violation of rights. Especially in cases
charging serious crimes, an officer may know or learn that his conduct violated
constitutional standards and that the remedy for that breach is exclusion of important
(perhaps necessary) evidence of the defendant’s guilt. To avoid application of the
exclusionary rule, the officer calculatedly decides to lie. Usually, in the officer’s view,
the ends of justice – convicting the bad guy -- warrant the dishonesty. Thus, while the
exclusionary rule encourages compliance with the Constitution, it also advances, to some
degree, an incentive to lie and cover up conduct that may be construed as illegal itself.
A major weakness of the exclusionary rule is that its use is too diluted to
effectively reduce all unwanted police lies,242 some of which relate directly to whether or
not police violated someone’s constitutional rights, others of which suggest that the
defendant “did it” when, in fact, he did not. As explained in Section II.A. and B., the
Supreme Court does not apply the exclusionary rule strictly, even when police admittedly
lie to secure a search or arrest warrant. And the Court has held that the exclusionary rule
is inapposite even when police lie about why they conducted an otherwise reasonable

241

Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor, supra note 72. But see L. Timothy Perrin, H.
Mitchell Caldwell, Carol A. Chase, and Ronald W. Fagan, If It’s Broken, Fix It, 83 Iowa L. Rev. 669, 71136 (1998) (reporting results of an empirical study and concluding that the exclusionary rule is not an
effective deterrent).
242
Christopher Slobogin appears to agree. See Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary
Rule, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363.
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search or seizure.243 Decisions like Franks and Whren encourage truth-distorting police
lies when coupled with the Court’s current application of the exclusionary rule..
At the same time that the exclusionary rule is too weak in dealing with lies like
those in Franks and Whren, it is too inflexible in other instances, resulting in the
exclusion of evidence necessary to convict the factually guilty.244 Perhaps because of the
potentially harsh result of releasing such individuals, in some cases, police unilaterally
decide that lying is justified to avoid application of the rule.245 When police lie to avoid
the exclusionary rule, they decide who is entitled to constitutional protection without
judicial or legislative checks, undermining the aims of the Framers. Because there is no
safeguard against the whims or unconscious biases of the police, they may single out the
poor, black Americans, or other minorities for unconstitutional invasions. “Police in
major U.S. cities stop and question more than a million people each year[.]”246 In 2008,
police in New York city stopped 531,159 people.247 Fifty-one percent of those stopped
were black; thirty-two percent were Hispanic; eleven percent were white.248 Police
exercise individual discretion on whether and whom to stop, what questions to ask and
whether to search a bag, backpack, purse or the person.249
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Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
This is akin to the Supreme Court’s conclusion in Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
245
Dallin Oaks believed that illegal searches and seizures were “concentrated in a few types of crimes,
notably weapons and narcotics offenses” Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 681 (1969-1970) (citing court statistics showing that in Chicago and the
District of Columbia in 1969-70, “search and seizure issues account for an overwhelming proportion” of
motions to suppress and that most were gun and drug cases). See also Myron Orfield, Jr., Deterrence,
Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63 U. Colo. L Rev.
75, 118 (1992) (reporting results of an empirical survey of members of Chicago’s criminal justice system in
which prosecutors, judges and defense lawyers indicated “that police testimony that would not pass muster
in small cases suddenly becomes believable in a big case.”).
246
Associated Press, Police Stop More Than 1 Million People on Street, N.Y.Times, Oct. 8, 2009.
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Judges too have been known to strain facts or credibility determinations when
they perceive that an unfair outcome will result if the exclusionary rule were applied. In
such instances, judges sometimes give the benefit of the doubt to the government, even in
the face of significant evidence of police lies or other government misconduct.250 In
short, the anecdotal evidence suggests that police lie and that courts look the other way
when application of the rule would acquit suspects whom the police believe are factuallyguilty, at least when the charges are serious.251
Because the exclusionary rule is simultaneously too weak and too strong, the rule
should be modified so that it continues to deter unconstitutional conduct but so that it also
makes truth-distorting police lies very costly. It is time to modify the rule because the
Court’s current application is ineffective at deterring “bad” police lies. The current rule
imposes both an inadequate sanction to deter truth-distorting lies and too harsh a sanction
in cases in which the police candidly admit that they may have intruded on a suspect’s
constitutional rights to obtain evidence of the suspect’s factual guilt.
C.

How the Exclusionary Rule Should Be Modified for Truth

Evidence obtained as a result of truth-distorting police lies should be
systematically and quickly excluded from use at a defendant’s trial. There should be no
wavering and no balancing of interests. When a fact-finder (trial judge or jury)
determines that substantial evidence252 indicates that the police have lied to acquire
evidence or to conceal the way they gathered it, whether the lies are told in an affidavit,
250

In Orfield’s study of Chicago, interviewees asserted that in serious cases, especially those with victims,
judges are more likely to find a way to avoid the suppression of evidence. Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury,
and the Heater Factor, supra note 72, at 115. Those same respondents explained that while police are
more likely to lie in “big,” significant cases, judges are more likely to credit their testimony in the big
cases. Id. at 118.
251
Orfield, Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor, supra note 54.
252
While difficult to quantify, in this Article, “substantial evidence” means more than a hunch or suspicion
but less than a finding by a preponderance of the evidence.
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in a police report, in informal communications with other officers or potential witnesses,
at a hearing, or other court proceeding, all evidence proximately connected to that truthdistortion should be excluded. Customizing the current exclusionary rule to deal with
cases in which fact finders strongly suspect that police are lying will give the
exclusionary rule a potency to deter police from telling lies that distort factual innocence
and that conceal violations of citizens’ constitutional rights, a potency that the current
rule lacks and a strength that more accurately reflects the corrosive nature of police
dishonesty. The proposed modification will shift the benefit of the doubt to the innocent
defendant, reducing the likelihood of wrongful convictions, and will provide all citizens
with greater protection against rogue government actors. It will increase the penalties of
the exclusionary rule when police knowingly distort the factual happenings in a case.
This increase in sanction is justified because it will tend to reduce the number of truthdistorting lies, and that reduction should, in turn, reduce police misconduct, which
routinely prompts lies. In addition to adding deterrence value, the proposed modification
will return a respect for honesty and integrity to the criminal justice system.
A stronger, more reliable deterrent for truth-distorting police lies is necessary
because police officers are such an integral part of every criminal prosecution. If police
cannot be trusted to tell the truth, convictions resting on evidence gathered by them
cannot be trusted either. If the Supreme Court is really committed to truth-seeking and
intolerant of perjury, the proposed modification will better support these values. It will
also balance the scales of justice so that the government, (not just defendants),
experiences consequences when it distorts truth.253

253

In addition to the threat of a perjury prosecution that every witness faces if he or she lies under oath,
criminal defendants (at least in federal court) are regularly sentenced to additional time in prison for
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At the same time this Article proposes a stronger exclusionary rule for cases in
which police are suspected of telling truth-distorting lies, it argues that the exclusionary
rule should be modified to lessen its impact on cases in which the police tell the truth
about the lies they tell to a suspect (or others) in a good-faith effort to obtain evidence of
the suspect’s factual guilt and when they report honestly (whether in official or unofficial
police reports, affidavits, or in court proceedings) about their questionable conduct.
When the police “come clean” about their lies and misdeeds, the trial judge (and, if he or
she does not rule for exclusion, ultimately a citizen jury), should use a balancing
approach to decide whether the ends of justice in the particular case validated the police
lies or the potentially unconstitutional police behaviors.
Thus, as long as police are honest about their behavior, their statements, and the
suspect’s behavior and statements, the modified exclusionary rule proposed here will not
require the hexclusion of evidence. A judge will exclude evidence only if she weighs the
interests of the government’s questionable conduct, compares it with the defendant’s
interests in liberty, privacy, and a fair trial, and concludes that, on balance, the breach of
constitutional rights or the risk of wrongful conviction is too great to admit the evidence.
Nevertheless, even if the judge balances the competing interests and decides that the
interests weigh in favor of the government, she should expressly instruct a jury to reweigh those same interests and decide whether the defendant should be acquitted on the
basis of government dishonesty. If both judge and jury decide that fairness favors

“obstructing justice,” when they are convicted and the sentencing judge finds, by a preponderance of
evidence, that they lied during their trial testimony. See § 3C1.1, United States Sentencing Guidelines
(providing for a two-level increase in offense level when a defendant willfully obstructs justice during the
course of the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing). In addition, defendants can be criminally
prosecuted for lying to officers during the officers’ investigation of the defendant’s alleged crimes. See 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (criminalizing the knowing and willful falsification of a material fact “in any matter within
the jurisdiction of the . . . Government of the United States”).
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admitting the evidence, the trial will proceed. Should either judge or jury find that the
police over-reached and unilaterally decided guilt, or went too far in trampling
constitutional rights, all evidence causally connected to the police dishonesty will be
excluded from the case. If the government lacks other evidence to prove its case, the case
against the defendant will be summarily dismissed.
Because the available anecdotal evidence suggests that judges may already be
secretly (or unconsciously) using such a balancing approach, and straining to admit
evidence that the current exclusionary rule requires the court to exclude, the proposed
modification is preferable because it makes the process more transparent, adding integrity
to the system. Given that the exclusionary rule is a Court-created remedy, applied only
when the balance of interests weighs in favor of its application,254 there is no mandate to
exclude evidence, and when evidence is excluded, the message should be clear about why
it was.255
The proposed rule favors the government. Even when the police have mistakenly
violated a suspect’s rights or, in the heat of the chase, gone too far in obtaining evidence
of factual guilt, in deserving cases, the evidence will still be admitted. At the same time,

254

See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (indicating that “the exclusionary rule has never
been applied except ‘where its deterrence benefits outweigh its ‘ ‘substantial social costs’”).
255
Although the Court does not expressly say that it conducts this same weighing analysis when deciding
whether to exclude statements obtained by police in violation of Miranda, in fact, the Court uses a similar
assessment in that context too. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985)-Reverse order
(holding that when police violate Miranda and obtain a confession from a suspect, a later confession from
the same suspect that follows a proper Miranda warning need not necessarily be excluded pursuant to the
exclusionary rule and that a finder of fact must consider “the surrounding circumstances and the entire
course of police conduct with respect to the suspect in evaluating the voluntariness of [the second set of]
statements.”); James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 322 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that a
defendant’s statement obtained in violation of Miranda should be available as impeachment evidence when
a defense witness testifies in direct contradiction to the defendant’s statement, noting that “the exclusionary
rule does not apply where the interest in pursuing truth or other important values outweighs any deterrence
of unlawful conduct”). Only when the totality of the circumstances demonstrate that a defendant was
coerced to give a statement does the Court apply a per se rule of exclusion. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385 (1978); New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
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the proposed rule offers more protection to defendants and to the public. It increases
incentives for the trial judge to label suspected lies as lies. When a judge rules that the
police have lied and that the evidence must be excluded, no double jeopardy will attach.
Thus, if a judge believes that a reasonable jury is likely to be offended by the apparent
police dishonesty or extreme misconduct, he or she will have a greater incentive to
exclude evidence before a trial jury is impaneled and jeopardy attaches. Following a
judge’s finding of potential police dishonesty, the government will be on notice that it
cannot proceed unless it finds additional, untainted evidence of the defendant’s illegal
conduct. In close cases, where a jury is impaneled and sworn and then it finds lies or
undue and unconstitutional conduct by the police, jeopardy will have attached, risking the
likelihood that the government will be prevented from re-trying the defendant, even if
additional or overwhelming evidence of guilt is uncovered.
The proposed approach is consistent with a majority of the Supreme Court
Justices’ views regarding the primary goal of the exclusionary rule -- deterrence. And it
better serves the other, less popular, view of a minority of the Justices, that the
exclusionary rule should also encourage government and judicial integrity.256
A majority of the Supreme Court justifies its current balancing approach to the
exclusionary rule and the categorical exceptions it has created to the rule by pointing to
“the substantial costs” that application of the rule can cause.257 “The exclusionary rule
generates ‘substantial social costs,’ . . . which sometimes include setting the guilty free
and the dangerous at large. We have . . . repeatedly emphasized that the rule’s costly toll
256

See Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that the exclusionary rule not
only deters but also “serves other important purposes” including allowing the judiciary “to avoid the taint
of partnership in official lawlessness” and assures the people of the United States that “the government
would not profit from its lawless behavior”).
257
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.
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upon truth-seeking and law enforcement objectives presents a high obstacle for those
urging [its] application[.]”258 In short, the Court has carved out an exception to the
general rule of excluding evidence obtained in violation of the Constitution when: (1) the
costs of exclusion are great because they undermine legitimate law enforcement
objectives – i.e., convicting the guilty, or (2) the costs are great because they undermine
the imperative of our justice system – to uncover the truth, or (3) both objectives are
undermined.
The second cost – distorting truth – has been repeatedly cited by the Court when it
seeks to justify evidence of a defendant’s lack of credibility. For instance, in Harris v.
New York,259 the Court held that a prosecutor can introduce statements obtained in
violation of Miranda to impeach a testifying defendant because to prevent the prosecutor
from using such statements would turn Miranda into a “shield” providing “a license to
use perjury by way of a defense[.]”260 Similarly, the Court relied on a truth-finding
rationale in Oregon v. Hass,261 in holding that statements obtained in violation of a
suspect’s unequivocal request for counsel pursuant to Miranda were also permissible
ammunition for impeachment, noting: “We are, after all, always engaged in a search for
truth in a criminal case so long as the search is surrounded with the safeguards provided
by our Constitution.”262
The proposed rule, which would apply only in cases of suspected police
dishonesty, will do a better job than the current exclusionary rule of furthering the public
policies underlying the rule -- deterring police misconduct and promoting truth-telling in
258

Id. at 591 (internal citations omitted; first brackets in original).
401 U.S. 222 (1971).
260
Id. at 226.
261
420 U.S. 714 (1975).
262
Id. at 722.
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all criminal cases.263 It offers quicker, stronger, and more definitive police deterrence
benefits. When and if the police are found to have falsified evidence which is causally
connected to a criminal matter, the evidence will be excluded and the defendant released.
There will be no second look to evaluate whether the lies were important ones or whether
they might not have affected the outcome of the case. Through consistent application of
this bright-line rule, which implements real and certain consequences, the police will
come to understand that truth-distorting lies equal release of the accused and dismissal of
the case. This dependable rule not only will teach police the importance of telling the
truth, but also will encourage them, in close or doubtful cases, to corroborate evidence of
guilt. Because in close cases, the judge and jury will give the benefit of the doubt to the
defendant, officers will have strong incentives to demonstrate that there is significant
evidence of guilt from numerous and varied sources. Therefore, wrongful police
influence could not have played a role in tainting the evidence.
The proposed rule provides strong deterrence against police dishonesty. And it
honors the Court’s justifications for making exceptions to the general rule. The Court
denies application of the exclusionary rule when it deems the costs of excluding evidence
to be too great on the “truth-seeking” imperative of our criminal justice process, and
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Although a majority of the Court appears to apply the exclusionary rule on the sole ground that it serves
a necessary deterrence role, others on the Court adhere to other justifications attributed to the rule by the
Court in years past, including protection of judicial integrity and discouraging law breaking by those who
are tasked with upholding the laws. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961) (recognizing “judicial
integrity” as a consideration in applying the exclusionary rule to the states and noting that if the
government “becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law”); Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 707 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974) (Brennan, J. dissenting) (“the rule
also serves other important purposes: It enabl[es] the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official
lawlessness, and it assur[es] the people – all potential victims of unlawful government conduct – that the
government would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining
popular trust in government.”). The proposed rule furthers all of these goals.
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when legitimate law enforcement goals would be thwarted.264 The proposed rule
maximizes introduction of evidence that furthers truth-finding and conviction of the
guilty and minimizes the introduction of evidence that undermines either ideal.
Application of the modified exclusionary rule will resemble application of the
current exclusionary rule. In the first instance, a trial-level judge will be asked to evaluate
the veracity of officers’ and others’ testimony and evidence to determine what happened
and whether a defendant’s rights were violated. But the new rule calls for a different
standard of proof when the credibility of officers is called into question. It also provides
for more transparency when a judge finds that the police have told lies in furtherance of
identifying the guilty and proving his or her guilt.
If the judge concludes that there is significant evidence that the police have told
truth-distorting lies, she should exclude the evidence and dismiss the case against the
defendant. In contrast, if the judge finds that the police told truth-furthering lies, she
should weigh the cost of those lies (to the integrity of the system of justice and the
public’s confidence in that system) and compare those costs with the benefits that
resulted from telling them. Has a dangerous and culpable person been identified through
truth-furthering lies? The judge will make a formal finding on whether the ends of
justice (the apprehension and/or acquisition of evidence) justify the means (the lies),
given the specific circumstances of the case. If she finds that the evidence is weak or that
the danger to society did not warrant the lies the police told, she will order the evidence
excluded. If she finds that justice was served by the lies, the defendant can reargue her
case to the jury. The judge does not need to resort to the doctrine of “attenuation” or
other exceptions or explanations for her decision on exclusion. She will simply weigh
264

Herring, 129 S. Ct. at 701.
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the pros and cons and explain forthrightly in the record why, on balance, she found as she
did. But she will conduct this balancing process knowing that a citizen jury will reevaluate her assessment and with the understanding that her assessment is not
accompanied by double jeopardy consequences.
On appeal to the higher courts, the trial judge’s factual findings will be reviewed
for clear error,265 and her conclusions regarding the balance of interests will be reviewed
using a de novo standard.266 Significantly, however, under the proposed modification to
the exclusionary rule, the trial judge’s findings (both factual and balancing) will first be
subject to de novo review by a citizen jury. Before any trial on guilt is begun and before
any appeal can be taken to a higher court, a jury will consider the exclusionary issue.
If a citizen jury finds that the police told truth-distorting lies, (even if the judge
did not find truth-distortion), the defendant will be acquitted.267 If the jury finds that the
police told lies in a good-faith effort to “get the bad guy,” they will be asked to re-weigh
the justifications for the lies and determine whether the ends of justice supported the lietelling.
The jury might be instructed as follows on this point:
The police are not altogether prohibited from using deception during
their criminal investigations, including during interviews of persons suspected of
criminal activity. However, some police deception is harmful to our system of
justice in that it distorts the truth about events and circumstances and that type of
deception may result in errors about whether this defendant committed the crime
with which he is charged. In other words, some lies are told by law enforcement
officers to uncover the truth about a person’s involvement in criminal
265

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 145 (1986) (clear error standard applies to district court’s non-guilt
factual findings).
266
United States v. Mayer, 560 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 2009) (indicating that de novo review applies to district
court’s denial of motion to dismiss).
267
It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider whether a panel of jurors will be empanelled to hear
multiple cases involving alleged police misconduct or whether a jury can appropriately hear these issues
and later hear evidence regarding the defendant’s guilt.
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wrongdoing. But sometimes police deception impairs our confidence in the
voluntariness of a suspect’s statement or in a suspect’s actual guilt.
It is your job as jury to consider whether the police engaged in any
deception in this case. You must make a specific finding on this issue,
indicating: Yes, the police used deception; or No, the police did not use
deception.
If and only if you find that the police engaged in deception during the
investigation of this case, you should answer a second question: Were the police
justified in using the deception that they used, given the specific circumstances
of this case? You must choose one of two answers: 1) Although the police used
deception, the deception was justified in this case; or 2) The police’s use of
deception in this case was not justified.
If the jury concludes that the ends of justice were not furthered by the police’s
deception, the evidence obtained as a result of the police’s lies will be excluded from the
trial of the case. The government can proceed with its case only if it has sufficient other
evidence to obtain a conviction.
The only exception to this new, transparent balancing process would be for cases
in which it appears that evidence was obtained from a suspect through coercion. The
Court’s blanket prohibition for coerced and involuntary statements would apply if either
judge or jury found that evidence was obtained from a defendant through compulsion.268
Unlike the present proposal, which argues for a significant change in how the
exclusionary rule is applied, Christopher Slobogin has argued that the exclusionary rule
should be abolished269 and that money damages should be substituted as the sanction for
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Although it exceeds the scope of this paper, in promoting truth-finding, a notable and significant
distinction could be drawn between coercive techniques that promise leniency versus those that threaten the
opposite.
269
Slobogin makes an exception “when police flagrantly abridge Fourth Amendment rights or illegally
seize private papers.” Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev.
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Exclusionary Rule, 26 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 119 (2003) (defending the benefits of the rule while
acknowledging its weaknesses).
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Fourth Amendment violations.270 Slobogin’s proposal is broader than the modification
proposed here in that it reaches all breaches of the Fourth Amendment, not just incidents
in which police tell lies.271 But his proposal would encompass such cases; therefore, the
proposal deserves addressing.272 In short, it is unlikely that the damages actions that he
proposes will more effectively deter police lies while simultaneously serving the other,
core values of our system. In his article arguing that “[t]he exclusionary rule is
significantly flawed as a deterrent device, especially when compared to more direct
sanctions on the police and police departments[,]”273 Professor Slobogin relies on
behavioral theory in asserting that the exclusionary rule is flawed because it “is both a
weak punishment and a weak reward.”274 He later adds, “The rule is a punishment, but
only minimally so from the behavioral perspective.”275
Slobogin asserts that one key defect in the exclusionary rule is that it is not
applied in “the vast majority of illegal searches and seizures”276 and when it otherwise
might be applied, “exclusion’s punch is reduced considerably by police facility in lying
about their actions, the hindsight biasing effect of judicial knowledge that criminal
evidence was found, and judicial reticence in excluding dispositive evidence.”277 Finally,
Slobogin prefers damages rather than the current exclusionary rule because “[e]ven when
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His proposal is also narrower than the one proposed here in that it is directed to the Fourth Amendment,
not violations of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
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version of the exclusionary rule.
273
Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. Ill. L. Rev. 363, 365 (1999).
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exclusion results, it is not a particularly strong punishment.”278 One of the main reasons,
he says, is that “the primary goal of officers in the field . . . is to get a ‘collar.’”279 The
police view the successful prosecution of the collar as the prosecutor’s job.280
The modified exclusionary rule proposed here performs considerably better
against Slobogin’s criticisms than does the Court’s current version of the rule. The
modified rule proposed would provide a quick and powerful deterrent that would bar,
without exception, police who tell truth-distorting lies in an effort to “get the bad guy.”
Unless police are satisfied with an arrest accompanied by no punitive consequences to the
arrestee, the proposed rule would encourage them to think carefully before telling lies
about what they did or said and the conduct and words of the defendant. If cross
examinations or conflicting evidence suggest that officers are lying, judge and jury would
be required to acquit the defendant. This quick and serious consequence provides a much
stronger deterrent against police lies than the current rule.
The second theory on which Slobogin relies in arguing for damages in lieu of the
exclusionary rule is a “legitimacy-compliance” theory.281 In Slobogin’s recap of this
theory, which was developed by Tom Tyler, he says that “deterrence is not the only, and
may not be the primary, reason people follow legal mandates.”282 Instead, this theory
goes, “people comply with the law for a complex set of reasons that include cost-benefit
analysis . . . the norms of peers, one’s own norms, and the perceived legitimacy of the
authorities.”283 On this point too, the modified exclusionary rule proposed here would
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seem to fare better than the Court’s current rule (and probably better than abolition of the
rule too).
The proposed rule would allow officers to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and
decide whether the risk of exclusion was too great or whether to “catch the bad guy”
extreme measures, including possibly unconstitutional behaviors, were necessary.
Importantly, then officers would have an opportunity to explain the justifications for their
behavior to judge and jury, arguing why they thought the ends of justice warranted the
extreme action they took. In Fourth Amendment parlance, judge and jury would decide
whether the search or seizure was “reasonable” given the importance of pursuing the
intrusion. If the judge and jury agree that the officer’s deception was justified, the
evidence survives. In this way, not only can officers conduct a cost-benefit analysis, but
also “the people” are protected from government overreaching by judicial oversight and,
further, by oversight by the citizenry, advancing core goals of the Bill of Rights.
Accordingly, this Article proposes a solution to reduce the flaws in the current
exclusionary rule, which Professor Slobogin has identified, but it retains operation of an
exclusionary rule, which appears to have at least some deterrent value as is. It also relies
on judges and ultimately juries to ensure that individuals are protected from overzealous
police and other government actors who may not adequately protect individual rights.
This additional oversight from judges and juries furthers the Framers’ goals of protecting
“the people” from the unbridled discretion of police officers who are restricted to
searching and seizing only when it is “reasonable” and allows a direct and transparent
jury check on government overreaching during criminal investigations.
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The most controversial circumstances for application of the proposed, modified
exclusionary rule will probably occur when an officer knows he does not have probable
cause to search for evidence; yet, he decides to search anyway and his search uncovers
damning evidence of a defendant’s serious criminal conduct. This probably happened,
for instance, during the investigation of the death of Nicole Brown Simpson when Los
Angeles police officers entered O.J. Simpson’s estate without a warrant by jumping a
fence. The officers later testified that they entered only out of concern for the safety of
people inside the estate.284
If the presiding judge in the O.J. case had strongly suspected the officers’
testimony to be untruthful, the rule proposed here would require exclusion of the bloody
glove found during the Fourth Amendment search. But if the police had honestly
explained what they did and why they did it, the proposed rule would allow the judge,
and ultimately a citizen jury, to balance the competing interests and decide whether the
interests of justice weigh in favor of allowing the prosecutor to use the evidence at trial.
A similar result would follow in the “black box” case highlighted in the introduction to
this Article.285 If the police had testified honestly about how they uncovered the cocaine
and why they suspected the defendant of the corresponding drug crimes, the judge and, if
necessary, a jury, could have considered the facts of the case and determined whether the
benefits of apprehending that particular defendant for that specific criminal violation
justified the officers actions, even if those actions violated the Fourth Amendment.
Conclusion
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Although we may never know how many law enforcement officers lie to “get the
bad guy” or to conceal their own misconduct or that of other government agents, we
know that police lies have plagued our criminal justice system for years, casting doubt on
the validity of convictions and undermining jurors’ and others’ faith in the system’s
integrity. Prosecutors, defense lawyers, and judges appear to agree that police sometimes
lie, even under oath.
Although some police lies undermine the core aims of our system – to convict the
guilty and exonerate the innocent – other police lies support these goals. In other words,
there are some police lies that expose the truth about a defendant’s factual guilt. Lies told
by police as part of an undercover ruse, which expose otherwise undetectable criminal
conduct, are an example. Police lies like these, which further the truth about factual guilt,
should be openly and expressly permitted. But police lies that conceal the truth about a
suspect’s actual conduct or innocence, and police lies that conceal wrongdoing and
unconstitutional behavior by the police, must be more effectively discouraged.
Although still debated, most appear to agree that the exclusionary rule effectively
discourages some unconstitutional police conduct. Nevertheless, as currently applied by
the United States Supreme Court, the exclusionary rule fails to sufficiently deter those
police lies that distort the truth about a defendant’s guilt and an officer’s unconstitutional
conduct. In fact, there is evidence to suggest that in the suppression context, the
exclusionary rule may encourage these lies.
Because truth-distorting police lies are destructive of the core aims of a fair and
effective criminal justice system, the exclusionary rule should be modified for cases
hinging on police credibility. The modification should be tailored so that it continues to
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discourage unconstitutional behavior by the police, but changed so that it reduces the
number of lies the police tell that have the potential to jeopardize accurate verdicts of
guilt.
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